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ARTICLES
REFORM OF SECTION 355
BRET WELLS*
Section 355 is one of the most important provisions in U.S. corporate tax law
because, after the 1986 Tax Reform Act, it remains the principle means of
allowing for a tax-free spin-off and disposition of businesses in the publicly
traded corporate context. Yet, the provision has received very limited scholarly
attention. The Article addresses a gap in existing literature by addressing the
normative goals of this provision and its deficiencies. Section 355 has had a
curious and troubled history.
In 1986, Congress enacted major tax reform legislation, but section 355 was
not reformed as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In 2017, Congress again
enacted major tax reform legislation, but similar to 1986, Congress did not reform
section 355 either. In the intervening years from 1987 through 2016, section 355
was amended eleven times, making it the most amended provision in subchapter
C during this period. The policy goals that motivated these amendments have
been remarkably consistent, namely these reforms sought to ensure that section 355
did not provide taxpayers with an inappropriate device for circumventing the
intended scope of Congress’s repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
In addition, Congress provided the Treasury Department with broad
regulatory authority to ensure that its purpose in repealing the General Utilities
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doctrine would not be circumvented through any other provision of law
(including section 355), and the Treasury Department has issued regulatory
guidance in an effort to effectuate this goal. But, in like manner, the Treasury
Department’s proposed amendments to its section 355 regulations also have
fallen short of the appropriate mark.
The result of these congressional amendments and of the Treasury Department’s
ongoing regulatory efforts is that section 355 has become needlessly complex and
subjective. Section 355’s needless subjectivity creates an administrative working
law that is close to unfathomable to many experienced tax professionals. And yet,
the added complexity and subjectivity does not forestall section 355 from affording
tax-free treatment to corporate separations that are more akin to a disposition of
an historic business to new shareholders. Seen in its proper context, section 355’s
nonrecognition treatment is justifiable only in the limited scenario of a corporate
separation (motivated by business necessities) among historic shareholders who
seek to continue their interest in the corporation’s historic businesses, albeit in
modified corporate form. The effectiveness of section 355 in providing a vehicle
to side-step Congress’s General Utilities repeal is now widely understood and has
caused some to laud section 355 as “the heartbeat of mergers and acquisition
activity in the United States.” In short, section 355 is a mess.
But, why has section 355 become such a mess and what must be done to reform
section 355? This Article seeks to answer both of these organizing questions and
then sets forth a reform proposal that, if adopted, would finally allow section
355 to fulfill its core mission without creating an inappropriate means to avoid
Congress’s repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ................................................................................ 449
I. Evaluation of Section 355 as Currently Constructed ..... 455
A. Section 355 in the General Utilities Era ...................... 455
B. Congress’s Intended Scope of its General Utilities
Repeal ........................................................................ 464
C. Treasury Department’s Use of its Delegated
Authority to Recalibrate the Device Test to
Address General Utilities Repeal ................................. 490
II. Reform of Section 355 ................................................... 495
A. Reformation of the Device Test ................................ 497
1. The device test should deny section 355
treatment unless more than fifty percent of
the value of both the distributing corporation
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and the controlled subsidiary is attributable to
historic active trade or business assets ...................... 497
a. Example #1: substantial nonbusiness assets ... 499
2. The device test should deny nonrecognition
treatment for stock if shareholders receive
excessive value due to disproportionate
leverage in either the distributing corporation
or the controlled subsidiary ................................. 501
a. Example #2: nonrecogition treatment
due to disproportionate leveraging .............. 502
B. New Section 355(d) and the Continuity of
Interest Test ............................................................... 503
C. New Section 355(d) ................................................... 505
1. Section 355 ownership change rule .................... 505
2. Consequences of failing continuity of
shareholder interest ............................................. 506
a. Example #3 .................................................... 508
b. Example #4 .................................................... 509
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INTRODUCTION
In 1986, Congress enacted major tax reform legislation, but section
355 was not reformed as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In 2017,
Congress again enacted major tax reform legislation, but similar to
1986, Congress did not amend section 355 in that reform effort either.
However, in the intervening years from 1987 through 2016, section 355
was amended eleven times,1 making it the most amended provision in
subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code during this period. The
policy goals that motivated these amendments have been remarkably
consistent; namely to ensure that section 355 did not provide taxpayers
with an inappropriate device for circumventing the intended scope of

1. See Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 311(a), 129 Stat. 2242, 3090 (2015); Pub. L. No. 113295, § 221(a)(50), 128 Stat. 4010, 4045 (2014); Pub. L. No. 110-172, § 4(b), 121 Stat.
2473, 2476 (2007); Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 410(a), 120 Stat. 2922, 2963 (2006); Pub. L.
No. 109-222, §§ 202, 507(a), 120 Stat. 345, 348, 358–59 (2006); Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§ 6010(c)(2), 112 Stat. 685, 813 (1998); Pub. L. No. 105-34, §§ 1012(a)–(b)(1),
1014(c)–(d), 111 Stat. 788, 914, 916, 921 (1997); Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1704(t)(31),
110 Stat. 1755, 1889 (1996); Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 11321(a), 11702(e)(2), 104 Stat.
1388, 1388-460, 1388-515 (1990); Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 2004(k)(1), 102 Stat. 3580,
3605 (1988); Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10223(b), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-411 (1987).
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Congress’s repeal of the General Utilities2 doctrine. But, notwithstanding
Congress’s repeated efforts, section 355’s scope has not been
appropriately curtailed through these enactments.3
In addition, Congress provided the United States Treasury
Department with broad regulatory authority to ensure that its purpose
in repealing the General Utilities doctrine would not be circumvented
through any other provision of law, including section 355,4 and the
Treasury Department has issued regulatory guidance in an effort to
effectuate this goal.5 Similar to Congress’s failed efforts to curb the

2. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
3. See infra Section I.B.
4. See I.R.C. § 337(d) (2012); see also infra note 77. Shortly after the 1986 Tax
Reform Act, the son-of-mirror transaction was developed as a technique to circumvent
the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. Under the son-of-mirror technique, an
acquiring company would acquire the stock of a target company at fair market value.
The acquiring company would then cause the target company to distribute its wanted
assets to the acquirer, thus generating gain within the acquirer’s consolidated group
and thereby increasing the acquirer’s basis in the stock of the target by the amount of
that gain. The acquirer then could sell the target’s stock at a time when the target
company held only unwanted assets. As a result, an artificial loss was created that
approximated the amount of the previously recognized gain that occurred upon the
distribution of the wanted assets out of the target. In response to the son-of-mirror
technique, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) stated that it would deny the intended
tax benefits of the transaction with future regulations that would have retroactive
effect. See I.R.S. Notice 87-14, 1987-1 C.B. 445; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20 (2008)
(as amended by T.D. 8364, 1991-2 C.B. 43) (finalizing the loss disallowance rule in
1991); Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding
that the duplicated loss provisions of the loss disallowance rules were an invalid
exercise of regulatory authority). But see I.R.S. Notice 2002-11, 2002-1 C.B. 526
(arguing that the finding of invalidity in “the Rite Aid opinion implicates only the loss
duplication aspect of the loss disallowance regulation” and not the factors dealing with
the son-of-mirror problem). In response to the Rite Aid decision, the IRS and Treasury
Department promulgated two regulations to replace the loss disallowance rules. See
T.D. 9187, 2005-1 C.B. 778 (adopting four temporary treasury regulations: Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.337(d)-2T (2002); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-35T (2003); Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32T (2003); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21T (2010)); see also T.D.
9424, 2008-2 C.B. 1012 (adopting final unified rules for loss on subsidiary stock). For
further discussion of the complicated final unified loss disallowance regulations, see
David B. Friedel, Final Loss Disallowance Rules: A New World Order, 35 CORP. TAX’N 33
(2008); and Don A. Leatherman, A Survey of § 1.1502-36, in 29 THE CORPORATE TAX
PRACTICE SERIES: STRATEGIES FOR ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT
VENTURES, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 451–57 (Louis S. Freeman ed., 2017).
5. See, e.g., Guidance Under Section 355 Concerning Device and Active Trade or
Business, 81 Fed. Reg. 46,004 (proposed July 15, 2016) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
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scope of section 355, the Treasury Department’s proposed amendments
to its section 355 regulations have also fallen short.6
The result of these congressional amendments and of the Treasury
Department’s ongoing regulatory efforts is that section 355 has
become needlessly complex and subjective.
This creates an
administrative working law that is close to unfathomable to many
experienced tax professionals. Yet, the added complexity and
subjectivity does not forestall section 355 from affording tax-free
treatment to corporate separations that are more akin to a disposition
of a historic business to new shareholders.7
Said differently, section 355’s complexity and subjectivity facilitate
its use as a device for historic businesses to be separated out of a
common corporate ownership in a tax-free manner and transferred to
new owners. Section 355, as currently constructed, allows historic
shareholders to monetize their investment in historic businesses in a
tax-free manner. The ability to use section 355 to achieve those results
represents a significant deficiency because those outcomes
inappropriately circumvent Congress’s effort to repeal the General
Utilities doctrine.
Seen in its proper context, section 355’s
nonrecognition treatment is justifiable only in the limited scenario of a
corporate separation—motivated by business necessities—among
historic shareholders who seek to continue their interest in the
corporation’s historic businesses, albeit in modified corporate form.8
The effectiveness of section 355 in providing a vehicle to side-step
Congress’s General Utilities repeal is now widely understood and has
caused some to laud section 355 as “the beating heart of mergers and
acquisitions activity in the United States.”9 In short, section 355 is a
mess. But, why has section 355 become such a mess, and what must be
done to reform section 355? The remainder of this Article seeks to
answer both of these organizing questions.
To begin with, some of the discontinuity and complexity in section
355 is explained by the fact that it was forged in a period prior to the

6. See infra Section I.C.
7. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(3) (2001); Rev. Proc. 2017-52, 2017-41 I.R.B. 283.
8. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1) (1989) (containing the continuity of
shareholder interest standard as a long-existing provision within section 355).
However, the subjectivity in applying this shareholder continuity test is in need of
greater certainty and objectivity in terms of its application.
9. Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Spinning, Acquiring, and Disposing, 158 TAX NOTES 101,
101 (2018).

452

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:447

repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.10 In that prior era, the General
Utilities doctrine generously allowed assets to leave corporate solution
without corporate level gain.11 However, the device test and the
business purpose test that undergird section 355, forged in the General
Utilities era, promote a shareholder level tax objective: ferret out
corporate separations that constitute a device to bail out corporate
earnings and profits in avoidance of the shareholder dividend tax. But
even so, the original policy rationale that justified section 355’s
existence in that formative era, and the policy rationale that justifies its
continued existence in the post-General Utilities era, has been
remarkably constant. In Section I.A, this Article sets forth how section
355 evolved in the General Utilities era and then defends the proposition
that section 355, at its core, was designed to afford nonrecognition
treatment to corporate separations—motivated by business necessities—
when those separations involve historic shareholders who seek to
continue their interest in the corporation’s historic businesses, albeit in
modified corporate form. Corporate separations in that context are
afforded nonrecognition treatment because those corporate
separations do not represent a disposition of a historic business to new
shareholders, nor do corporate separations in that context principally
involve shifting the ownership of financial nonbusiness assets among the
historic shareholders. Instead, corporate separations executed in that
context are best described as merely a readjustment of the shareholders’
continuing interest in the underlying historic businesses in modified
corporate form. However, section 355 is overly broad and can apply
beyond the scope of that core mission, and its overbreadth infringes on

10. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 206 (1935) (holding
that a distribution of assets by a corporation to its shareholders did not constitute a
sale or exchange of the distributed assets and accordingly the distributing corporation
did not realize a taxable gain or loss from the distribution); see 1 BORIS I. BITTKER ET
AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 8.20, at 8–64
(7th ed. 2018) (explaining that the General Utilities doctrine was codified in the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 in old section 311(a)(2) as to non-liquidating distributions and
in old section 336 with respect to liquidating distributions); see also H.R. REP. NO. 99841, pt. 1, at 198 (1986); infra Section II.B, II.C (discussing the impact that the repeal
of the General Utilities doctrine has had and normatively should have on circumscribing
the scope of section 355).
11. See Edward S. Cohen et al., Corporate Liquidations Under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 37–55 (1955) (analyzing how Congress explicitly
endorsed allowing appreciated corporate assets to leave corporate solution without
corporate level tax and detailing how the 1954 Code attempted to provide certainty
and taxpayer electivity in applying the General Utilities doctrine under prior law).
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the scope of Congress’s competing post-1986 goal of implementing a
“strong form”12 version of repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
In Section I.B, this Article seeks to frame this tension by first
demonstrating that Congress, in the post-1986 period, has been
motivated by a “strong form” of General Utilities repeal. After laying that
predicate, Section I.B then sets forth the case for why section 355 should
not afford nonrecognition treatment to a disposition of a historic
business to non-historic shareholders as doing so violates the goals of
the “strong form” of General Utilities repeal. The analysis in Section I.B
demonstrates that Congress’s repeated amendments to section 355 are
explainable only in terms of furthering a “strong form” version of General
Utilities repeal, but the actual statutory amendments overly rely on
subjective standards that inhibit their effectiveness. The analysis in
Section I.B, therefore, lays the foundation for identifying the
deficiencies within section 355 that impede the harmonization of
section 355’s scope with Congress’s desired “strong form” of General
Utilities repeal. The overbreadth in section 355’s scope is objectionable
because it allows taxpayers to utilize it as a device for transferring historic
businesses in a tax-free manner to new shareholders in transactions that
are more akin to a disposition. The enlistment of section 355’s
nonrecognition treatment for transactions that are more akin to a
disposition causes section 355 to stray beyond its core mission and
contravenes Congress’s competing goal of wanting to implement a
“strong form” version of General Utilities repeal. In Section I.C, this Article
then sets forth the tentative steps that the Treasury Department has taken
to implement the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine and how those
actions have not been sufficient to address section 355’s overbreadth.
In Part II, this Article sets forth how section 355 should be reformed
to promote both its core mission and Congress’s efforts to implement
a “strong form” version of repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
Specifically, this Article argues that the device test should be
reformulated so that section 355 would not be satisfied if more than
fifty percent of the assets of either the distributing corporation or the
controlled subsidiary are non-historic business assets. Moreover, as a
further reform to the device test, this Article argues that the device test
should not afford tax-free status to the releveraging aspects of a section

12. Scholars for decades have used this well-known nomenclature. See, e.g., Eric
M. Zolt, The General Utilities Doctrine: Examining the Scope of the Repeal, 65 TAXES 819,
822 (1987) (referring to the alternatives views of the General Utilities repeal as “strong
form” and “weak form”).
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355 transaction in situations where excessive leverage is shifted
between the distributing corporation and the controlled corporation.
Thus these releveraging techniques allow shareholders to monetize
their interest in a historic business in a manner that is more akin to a
disposition. These reforms of the device test are discussed in greater
detail in Section II.A.
In addition to reformulating the device test, this Article argues that
Congress should amend section 355(d) to require all corporate
separations to satisfy an objective continuity of interest standard.
Specifically, this Article proposes that a corporate separation would
create corporate level gain if there were an ownership change within
either five years prior to or two years after a section 355 transaction.
This time period represents a synthesis of the testing periods that now
exist in section 355(d) and section 355(e). Section 355(d) provides,
in part, for a five-year pre-spin-off testing period. Moreover, section
355(e) provides, in part, for a post-spin-off continuity period of two
years to assure that a corporate separation was motivated by the
shareholders’ desire to continue to own their historic interest until the
transactions are old and cold.
In terms of applying this Article’s prescriptive continuity of interest
testing period, this Article proposes that the ownership change criteria
set forth in section 382 should be utilized in lieu of the subjective
criteria that undergirds existing sections 355(d) and section 355(e).
In this regard, section 382 provides an objective set of criteria to
determine an ownership change and sets forth an administrable rule
that disregards ownership changes among less than five percent of
shareholders. Thus, by relying on the objective criteria set forth in
section 382 to determine whether sufficient historic shareholder
continuity of interest exists throughout the testing period, this Article’s
proposal sets forth a clear rule that promotes the core mission of
section 355 and does so in a manner that forestalls section 355’s use as
a means to circumvent Congress’s repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine. The contours of this repurposed, new section 355(d) are set
forth in greater detail in Section II.B.
Once the new section 355(d) provisions set forth in this Article are
adopted, the existing provisions of section 355(d) and section 355(e)
could be eliminated as redundant. Moreover, once the device test—
repurposed along the lines set forth in Section II.A—is concomitantly
adopted, then section 355(g) and the subjective device test set forth in
Treasury Regulation section 1.355-2(d) could be repealed. The
refocused device test set forth in Section II.A seeks to differentiate
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between those corporate separations that inappropriately circumvent
Congress’s intended repeal of the General Utilities doctrine from those
corporate separations that are justified under the core mission of
section 355. In contrast, the device test under current law, focuses on
an obsolete shareholder bail out concern that no longer is relevant
given the rate parity that exists for qualified dividends and long-term
capital gains rates.
In combination, the section 355 reforms advocated in this Article
seek to fully implement the “strong form” version of General Utilities
repeal that Congress has attempted to enact in the post-1986 period by
adopting objective and transparent rules that replace the subjective
standards currently utilized by section 355’s provisions.13 The
subjectivity that lies at the heart of section 355(d), section 355(e), and
the current formulation of the device test, creates needless complexity
and hinders the harmonization of section 355’s scope with Congress’s
competing goal of implementing a “strong form” version of General
Utilities repeal. Thus, this Article’s reform proposals, if adopted, would
provide much needed objectivity and transparency in the manner of
section 355’s application.
I. EVALUATION OF SECTION 355 AS CURRENTLY CONSTRUCTED
A. Section 355 in the General Utilities Era
To begin with, it must be understood that section 355’s allowance
for tax-free corporate separations is one of the longest standing aspects
of subchapter C. From a historical perspective, it is helpful to consider
Rockefeller v. United States,14 as this was an important early case that came
before the legislative adoption of section 355’s predecessor. In 1911,
John D. Rockefeller had lost a critical antitrust case,15 which was
followed by another loss in 1914 that required him to separate his
monopolistic pipeline business into a separate corporation that was
spun-off to the shareholders.16 The Supreme Court eventually agreed
with the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) determination that Mr.
Rockefeller and the other shareholders had received a taxable stock
dividend upon their receipt of the stock of the spun-off controlled
13. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557 (1992) (discussing the benefits of using rules instead of standards for resolving
repetitive legal questions).
14. 257 U.S. 176 (1921).
15. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
16. See The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548 (1914).
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subsidiary even though the spin-off was legally compelled and even
though the historic shareholders continued to own their investment in
the same businesses, albeit in modified corporate form.17 In 1918,
Congress responded to the perceived harshness of the shareholder
level taxable stock dividend result by enacting the predecessor to
section 355.18 In enacting section 355’s predecessor, Congress was
successful in alleviating its main concern to change the shareholder
taxable stock dividend result.19
It is important in this context to also remember that the corporate
level tax consequences of distributing appreciated property out of
corporate solution was not a dominant policy concern prior to 1986.
Yes, it is true that section 355’s predecessor—and section 355 as
currently envisioned—may provide nonrecognition treatment20 at the
corporate level for a qualifying section 355 distribution of appreciated
stock in a controlled subsidiary. However, in the pre-1986 era, it was

17. Rockefeller, 257 U.S. at 181–84; accord Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134, 137–38
(1923) (holding that the shareholder had a gain equal to the difference in the value
of the shares received and their basis in the stock of the liquidating distributing
corporation); see United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 165, 173–75 (1921) (finding on
the same day as Rockefeller, that shareholders received a taxable stock dividend after the
E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Company transferred all its assets to a new subsidiary,
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. in exchange for all of its stock plus debt instruments,
and then E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Company transferred the stock in E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. to its shareholders).
18. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1919).
Congress modified the predecessor to section 355 in 1921 and 1924. See Revenue Act
of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 203(h)(1)(B), 43 Stat. 253, 257 (1924) (codifying section
355’s predecessor as follows: “a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to
another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its stockholders
or both are in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred”); Revenue
Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 227, 230 (1921).
19. See Peter C. Canellos, The Section 355 Edifice: Spinoffs Past, Present, and Future,
104 TAX NOTES 419, 420 (2004) (“[T]he basic outlines of section 355 were drawn to
deal with a tax environment in which tax rates on dividends received by individuals
greatly exceeded those on capital gains. The complex and strict requirements of
section 355 derive from concerns over dividend avoidance, not the avoidance of gain
recognition that is typically the concern in the reorganization area. This concern was
most evident in the ‘device’ clause but also in the other provisions designed to assure
that the spin-off was a true reorganization resulting from business needs (far beyond
the business purpose test normally applied to corporate transactions), and involving a
controlled subsidiary in an active business. The rate difference, of course, was
eliminated in 2003, which calls into question the need for all the complex safeguards
contained in section 355.”).
20. But see I.R.C. § 355(d)(1) (2012) (specifying corporate level gain in certain
situations); § 355(e)(1) (further specifying corporate level gain in certain situations).
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possible to distribute appreciated property to shareholders in taxable
transactions without incurring corporate level tax in reasonably
available alternatives. Thus, even though section 355 generally affords
nonrecognition treatment at the corporate level, distributions taxable at
the shareholder level could be structured in the pre-1986 era without
incurring corporate level taxation outside the context of section 355.21
Therefore, the corporate level nonrecognition treatment provided by
section 355’s predecessor was not unique.
In this regard, the Supreme Court in General Utilities held that a
corporation did not recognize gain as a result of its distribution of
appreciated property to its shareholders.22 Congress codified the General
Utilities doctrine to allow for nonrecognition treatment at the corporate level
for (1) distributions of appreciated property to its shareholders as
nonliquidating dividends;23 (2) liquidating or partially-liquidating
distributions;24 and (3) sales of appreciated assets made in connection with
qualifying liquidating distributions.25 This nonrecognition treatment, at the
corporate level, for distributions of appreciated assets out of the corporate
solution was so significant that it was widely identified as one of the “seven
basic decisions or principles” of the pre-1986 corporate tax law.26 Thus,
although section 355 provided nonrecognition treatment at the corporate
level to the distributee corporation, that result was not meaningfully
divergent from the tax results obtainable via reasonably available alternative
transactions due to the broad scope of the General Utilities doctrine.
Consequently, section 355, in its formative period, was principally
concerned with the shareholder level tax consequences of a corporate
separation rather than focused on the corporate-level consequences of
a corporate separation. Thus, the purpose of section 355 was to discern

21. See Esmark, Inc. v. Comm’r, 90 T.C. 171, 181–82, 185, 199–200 (1988), aff’d,
886 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989).
22. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 206 (1935).
23. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 311, 68A Stat. 93, 94–95
(1954). The legislative history makes clear that the intent of this provision was to
codify the rule development in the Supreme Court’s decision in General Utilities. See S.
REP. NO. 83-1622, at 46–47 (1954) (explicitly referencing the desire to codify the
General Utilities doctrine with an exception for distributions of LIFO inventory and an
exception for a distribution of property with a liability in excess of its tax basis); H.R.
REP. NO. 83-1337, at 37–38 (1954) (expressing the desire to codify the General Utilities
doctrine with the same exceptions expressed in the Senate report).
24. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 336, 68A Stat. 93, 106 (1954).
25. Id. § 337, 68A Stat. at 106–07.
26. See Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory
Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 96–97, 130 (1977).
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which business separations were, in substance, a device for shareholders
to bail out earnings and profits at capital gains rates, and which
corporate separations should instead be afforded nonrecognition
treatment because the corporate separation represented a readjustment
of the historic shareholder’s continuing interest, in modified corporate
form, in historic businesses.27
Here is where the landmark case of Gregory v. Helvering28 enters the
dialogue. Gregory stands on the other side of the spectrum from
Rockefeller and has forever altered section 355’s development. The facts
are well understood. Ms. Gregory, in 1928, owned all the stock of
United Mortgage Corp., which in turn owned a stock investment in
Monitor Securities Corp. (Monitor).29 A simple distribution of the
Monitor shares to Ms. Gregory would have been a taxable dividend.30
So, instead of engaging in a transaction that took that form, United
Mortgage Corp. formed a new corporation, Averill, and transferred its
Monitor shares to Averill.31 Shortly thereafter, United Mortgage Corp.
distributed all of the Averill shares to Ms. Gregory in a transaction that
the taxpayer claimed was a tax-free spin-off under section 355’s
predecessor.32 Averill then was liquidated, making Mrs. Gregory the
direct owner of the Monitor Shares.33 Under the General Utilities
doctrine, the Averill liquidation did not create a corporate level
taxable event, and Ms. Gregory asserted that she was entitled to capital
gains treatment on the exchange of her Averill stock for the Monitor
stock since she acquired the Monitor stock as part of a taxable
liquidation of Averill.34 Ms. Gregory won at the lower court level in a
1932 decision by the Board of Tax Appeals.35 In response to the tax
planning utilized here, Congress prospectively repealed section 355’s

27. For an excellent analysis of section 355 in its early years, see Charles S.
Whitman, III, Draining the Serbonian Bog: A New Approach to Corporate Separations under
the 1954 Code, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1194, 1238 (1968), which provides a thorough review
of the historical development and legislative history of the early years of section 355.
28. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
29. Id. at 467.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Gregory v. Comm’r, 27 B.T.A. 223, 226 (1932).
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predecessor that purportedly had allowed Ms. Gregory to receive the
Averill stock in a tax-free spin-off transaction.36
After this draconian congressional response, the Second Circuit,37
and then the Supreme Court,38 held for the government in the
subsequent appeals, thus reversing the taxpayer victory in Gregory. The
Court held that Ms. Gregory had, in substance, received a taxable stock
dividend distribution of the Averill stock from United Mortgage Corp.
under the following rationale:
[p]utting aside, then, the question of motive in respect of taxation
altogether, and fixing the character of the proceeding by what
actually occurred, what do we find? Simply an operation having no
business or corporate purpose—a mere device which put on the
form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its
real character, and the sole object and accomplishment of which was
the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a
business or any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of
corporate shares to the petitioner.39

In response to the Court’s holding, when Congress restored
nonrecognition treatment for spin-offs through its reenactment of
section 355’s predecessor in 1951, it added two new requirements to the
statute to address the tax planning technique highlighted by Gregory.40
First, Congress required that the distributing corporation and the
controlled corporation must conduct a historic active trade or business,
thus attacking the fact that Averill’s sole activity consisted of owning only
a passive investment in Monitor’s stock.41 Second, Congress provided
that the spin-off transaction must not be used principally as a device for
the distribution of earnings and profits to the distributing corporation’s
36. See Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, § 112, 48 Stat. 680, 704–06 (1934);
see also Donald L. Cordes, The Device of Divisive Reorganizations: An Analysis of Section
355(a)(1)(B) and Its Relation to Section 368(a)(1)(D) and the Doctrines of “Continuity of Interest”
and “Business Purpose,” 10 U. KAN. L. REV. 21, 23 (1961) (“The reason for this action
[repealing Section 355’s predecessor in 1934] was because the spin-off provisions were
often utilized by taxpayers as a means of avoiding taxes. A fairly common tactic was for
a corporation to transfer certain liquid assets, or passive investments, to a new
corporation and distribute the stock to the shareholders. The shareholders would then
liquidate the new corporation and receive what was in essence a dividend, but taxable,
however, only at capital gain rates.”).
37. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934).
38. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 470.
39. Id. at 469.
40. See Internal Revenue Code of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 317, 65 Stat. 452, 493 (1951).
41. See I.R.C. § 355(b) (2012); see also Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183,
§ 317, 65 Stat. 452, 493 (1951).
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shareholders;42 thus, in effect, codifying the substance-over-form device
test that was employed by the Court in Gregory.43
Seen in its historical context, the addition of the device test and the
historic active trade or business requirement, in combination,
represent congressional attempts to prevent the tax planning set forth
in Gregory, while still allowing tax-free readjustments where the historic
shareholders maintained a continuing shareholder interest in historic
businesses, albeit in modified corporate form.44 But, instead of
providing objective tests for distinguishing between qualifying and
nonqualifying transactions, Congress instead adopted a subjective
business purpose test and a subjective device test.
Obviously, the device test was codified into section 355’s predecessor
prior to the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.45 Again, in that era,
42. See I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B). This provision was added in section 317 of the
Revenue Act of 1951, 65 Stat. at 493–94.
43. In 1954, Congress expanded the applicability of these requirements so that
they also applied to split-offs and split-ups. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (requiring that a
section 368(a)(1)(D) reorganization include a distribution of stock that satisfies either
section 354(b), section 355, or section 356).
44. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469; see also H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 16 (1924) (“This is a
common type of reorganization, and clearly should be included within the
reorganization provisions of the statute.”); 65 CONG. REC. 2429 (1924) (statement of Rep.
Green) (stating that a usual form of reorganization is splitting one corporation into two
or more corporations). In this regard, existing Treasury regulations mirror this purpose.
Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1) (2016) (stating that the business purpose
requirement provides “nonrecognition treatment only to distributions that are incident
to readjustments of corporate structures required by business exigencies and that effect
only readjustments of continuing interests in property under modified corporate
forms”), with Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (“The purpose of the reorganization provisions of
the Code is to except from the general rule certain specifically described exchanges
incident to such readjustments of corporate structures made in one of the particular ways
specified in the Code, as are required by business exigencies and which effect only a
readjustment of continuing interest in property under modified corporate forms.
Requisite to a reorganization under the Internal Revenue Code are a continuity of the
business enterprise through the issuing corporation under the modified corporate
form . . . .”). Noted scholars have continued to point to this principal as the core feature
for section 355. See, e.g., Karla W. Simon & Daniel L. Simmons, The Future of Section 355,
40 TAX NOTES 291 (1988); George K. Yin, Taxing Corporate Divisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 289,
297 (2003). For an excellent analysis of this historical development of section 355
exemplifying the argument that the IRS’s restriction of the device test to only the
shareholder level rate concern was not inevitable given the legislative history, see
Whitman, supra note 27, at 1238.
45. The final repeal of the General Utilities doctrine occurred in 1986, but the correct
understanding of its historical evolution is that the doctrine diminished incrementally over
many decades, culminating in its final repeal in 1986. Congress and the courts created
numerous exceptions to the General Utilities doctrine. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 97TH
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assets leaving corporate solution without corporate level taxation were
not a significant policy concern. Thus, the focus of the device test was
directed towards bail out techniques that would circumvent shareholder
dividend taxation.46 Furthermore, the device test focused on only a
special subset of corporate separations that failed to demonstrate a
continuity of shareholder interest, namely those transactions that
facilitated a shareholder effort to bail out corporate earnings and profits
in a manner that avoided the shareholder dividend tax. In fact,
consistent with this historical context, existing Treasury Department
regulations articulated the contours of the device test by focusing on
whether a distribution represents a bail out of earnings and profits, or
instead, represents a corporate separation that is motivated by business
exigencies of historic active businesses among historic shareholders.47
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL
RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982 129–30 (Comm. Print 1982). In fact, even when section 311
was first enacted in 1954, the section already contained several exceptions to the General
Utilities doctrine for LIFO Inventory and property in which a liability exceeded its basis. See
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, §§ 311(b)–(c), 68A Stat. 3, 94–95
(1954). In 1969, section 311 was amended so that corporations using appreciated property
to redeem their own stock, where the fair market value of the property exceeded the
adjusted basis, were also excluded from non-recognition treatment. Tax Reform Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 905(a), 83 Stat. 487, 713–14 (1969) (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 311). In 1982, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act added subsection (e),
which designated certain definitions and special rules which were required to be complied
with to receive non-recognition treatment. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 223(a)(2), 96 Stat 324, 483–84 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 311).
Theses definitions and special rules included the required use of qualified stock, which was
defined as a stock holding period. Id. Section 311(e) also applied section 318 attribution
rules to stock holding requirement. Id. Finally, section 311(e)(2)(A) added the
requirements that (1) distributions must be made to qualified stock, (2) the assets must be
related to a qualified business, (3) the non-business assets must not have been contributed
through a section 351 contribution to capital within the last five years, and (4) more than fifty
percent of the controlled corporation must be distributed. Id. § 223(e)(2)(A).
46. This artificial restriction of the device test has been criticized even prior to the
repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. See Whitman, supra note 27, at 1238 (“By tying
the device clause of section 355 to sections 302 and 346, the IRS seems to be extending
the grant of favorable [section 355] treatment further than Congress intended.”).
47. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d) (2016) (stating that a spin-off facilitates avoiding
dividend provisions of the Code through selling or exchanging one corporation’s
stock and retaining stock in another). Device factors include: pro rata distribution;
subsequent sale of the controlled subsidiary’s stock by the shareholders; assets of the
distributing corporation or the controlled subsidiary that are not used in a five-year
trade or business; or the business of either the distributing corporation or the
controlled corporation represents a secondary business whose principal function is to
serve the other business and which could be sold without adverse effect on the other
business. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2)(ii)–(iv). In recognition of the bail out
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This formulation of the device test promoted the shareholder level
policy concern of that era, but focusing on these considerations caused
section 355 to differentiate between corporate separations that
represent a device for shareholders to access corporate earnings and
profits at capital gains rates, instead of solely focusing on the core
original question: did a corporate separation solely represent a
readjustment of historic businesses among historic shareholders or was
section 355 being used as a device for some other purpose? 48 Thus, the
device test, as it evolved in the General Utilities era, shifted attention away
from the issue of whether a transaction represented merely a
readjustment of interest in historic businesses among historic
shareholders to instead focus on whether a particular disposition
allowed historic shareholders to bail out earnings and profits at capital

concern, a distribution is ordinarily considered not to have been used principally as a
device if, in the absence of section 355, the distribution would be a redemption to
which section 302(a) or section 303(a) would have applied or if the distributing
corporation had no earnings and profits. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(5)(ii)–(iv).
Historically, the IRS has articulated that sale or exchange treatment presumptively
precludes the finding of a device. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 71-383, 1971-2 C.B. 180–81
(holding that “if the distribution were considered taxable, it would not result in
dividend income to the two shareholders receiving Y stock because the exchange of
their X stock as to each would have been a substantially disproportionate redemption
under section 302(b)(2) of the Code and thus would have been treated as a
distribution in part or full payment in exchange for such stock under section 302(a)
of the Code. Consequently, the transaction is not a device to distribute earnings and
profits (that is, to convert dividend income into capital gains)”); Rev. Rul. 64-102, 19641 C.B. 138 (stating that “there can be no device to distribute earnings and profits
because of the non pro rata distribution”). The extant case law has repeatedly applied
the device test to protect the shareholder rate differential and prevent a bail out of
corporate earnings and profits at capital gains rates, which is a shareholder level policy
question that does not have a continuing role today. See, e.g., Rafferty v. Comm’r, 452
F.2d 767, 770 (1st Cir. 1971) (discussing the effects of distribution of controlled
corporations); Comm’r v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184, 186 (9th Cir. 1965) (examining
distribution on taxpayers as a dividend paid for by the corporation); Gada v. United
States, 460 F. Supp. 859, 864 (D. Conn. 1978) (defining distribution as corporate “spin
off” of shareholders to the subsidiary); S. Tulsa Pathology Lab., Inc. v. Comm’r, 118
T.C. 84, 93–94 (2002) (holding that the device test applies where a private distributing
corporation distributes a controlled subsidiary pro rata and the shareholders sold all
the controlled subsidiary’s stock in a prearranged plan that same day).
48. For an excellent analysis of the early evolution of the judicially created
continuity of shareholder interest doctrine and the framing of the Gregory decision as
part of the development of the continuity of interest doctrine, see David F. Shores,
Reexamining Continuity of Shareholder Interest in Corporate Divisions, 18 VA. TAX REV. 473,
482–83 (1999); David F. Shores, Reexamining Continuity of Shareholder Interest in Corporate
Reorganizations, 17 VA. TAX REV. 419, 452 (1998) [hereinafter Corporate Reorganizations].
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gains rates.49 Again, in an era where the General Utilities doctrine allowed
easy distribution of appreciated property out of corporate solution
without corporate level tax,50 it is not surprising that the device test did
not focus on protecting the corporate tax base, but instead focused on
protecting the shareholder dividend tax rate differential.51
Currently, section 1(h)(11) provides that qualified dividends
received by individual shareholders generally are taxed at the same
rate as long-term capital gains,52 and the American Taxpayer Relief Act
of 2012 made this tax rate parity permanent.53 Thus, unlike most of
the U.S. income tax history, individuals now are entitled to receive the
same preferential tax rate for qualified dividends as long-term capital
gains. Consequently, the historic shareholder level concern that
underlies the device test is no longer a relevant policy concern.54
49. See Corporate Reorganizations, supra note 48, at 423.
50. Protecting the corporate tax base from distributing appreciated assets out of
corporate solution was not a significant policy concern in section 355’s formative
period, as the General Utilities doctrine made that opportunity available in a broad
range of contexts. See Simon & Simmons, supra note 44, at 292 (summarizing the
disconnect between the policy concerns during section 355’s formative period and
today to explain that the main question in the current tax environment is “whether
stock acquisitions and dispositions that fit within the literal language of section 355
ought to be permitted when their principal purpose is avoidance of the corporate tax
on asset appreciation”).
51. See Canellos, supra note 19, at 420 (stating that the “basic outlines of section
355 were drawn to deal with a tax environment in which tax rates on dividends received
by individuals greatly exceeded those on capital gains. The complex and strict
requirements of section 355 derive from concerns over dividend avoidance, not the
avoidance of gain recognition that is typically the concern in the reorganization area.
This concern was most evident in the ‘device’ clause but also in the other provisions
designed to assure that the spin-off was a true reorganization”); see also Simon &
Simmons, supra note 44, at 293–94 (“Without a capital gain preference, the underlying
historic purpose behind the ‘device’ restriction and the active trade or business
requirements of section 355 largely disappears.”).
52. See BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 9.13
(3d ed. 2010).
53. I.R.C. § 1(h)(11)(A) (2012). Section 1(h) first applied for 2003. See Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 302, 117 Stat. 752,
760, 764 (2003). The provision initially applied only for the years 2003 through 2008,
but Congress extended its life twice. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 102(a), 124 Stat.
3296, 3298 (2010); Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-222, § 102, 120 Stat. 345, 346 (2006). In 2013, Congress made the provision
permanent. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 102, 126
Stat. 2313, 2318 (2013).
54. Although other noted commentators have proposed other reforms, it is widely
recognized that the device test was impacted by an extinct shareholder tax rate
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Moreover, unlike the prior era where the General Utilities doctrine
allowed easy escape of appreciated assets out of corporate solution
without incurring corporate level gains, the current era—as indicated in
the next two sections—instead is concerned with protecting against
efforts to avoid Congress’s repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. Thus,
the key question now, is whether a corporate separation is motivated by
a business purpose to separate historic businesses between historic
shareholders, or whether the corporate separation is being used as a
device to avoid the intended scope of the repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine. The device test needs to be repurposed for the modern era,
and the continuity of interest standard and the testing periods of
sections 355(d) and (e) need to be rationalized in order to fulfill
Congress’s goal in its repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.55 In Section
I.B and Section I.C, this Article addresses the scope of Congress’s
intended repeal of the General Utilities doctrine so that the appropriate
scope of section 355’s limited exception to that General Utilities repeal
can be properly framed. Thus, the analysis in Section I.B and Section
I.C lays the foundation for the reform proposals set forth in Part II.
B. Congress’s Intended Scope of its General Utilities Repeal
Before addressing how section 355 should be reformed, it is
necessary to properly frame the fundamental shift that occurred in
1986 due to the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, as section 355
cannot be properly positioned until Congress’s goal in its General
Utilities repeal is clear. The ability to distribute appreciated assets out
of corporate solution without incurring corporate level tax is exactly
what Congress decided was in need of fundamental reform in 1986.56

concern and as such does not adequately address today’s era. See Michael L. Schler,
Simplifying and Rationalizing the Spinoff Rules, 56 SMU L. REV. 239, 252 (2003) (“The
device test . . . is also inadequate in this situation. The test is a vague balancing
test . . . . Moreover, the test is focused on shareholder-level issues rather than General
Utilities repeal.”); see also Canellos, supra note 19, at 420 (“The rate difference . . . was
eliminated in 2003, which calls into question the need for all the complex safeguards
contained in section 355.”).
55. This parity of rates and grappling with the implications of rate parity on the
device test was explored early on by others. See, e.g., Joshua D. Blank, The Device Test in
a Unified Rate Regime, 102 TAX NOTES 513, 518–20 (2004).
56. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 282 (1985) (“[T]he General Utilities rule tends to
undermine the corporate income tax. Under normally applicable tax principles,
nonrecognition of gain is available only if the transferee takes a carryover basis in the
transferred property, thus assuring that a tax will eventually be collected on the
appreciation. Where the General Utilities rule applies, assets generally are permitted to
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In the end, Congress endorsed business tax reform that supported the
classic view of corporations57 by repealing the last vestiges of the General
Utilities doctrine.58 The intent of that major tax reform effort was to
ensure that built-in gain property, residing in corporate solution,
would be subject to corporate level taxation when and if such property
were disposed of.59 Thus, a corporation could no longer distribute
appreciated corporate assets without incurring a corporate level tax,
and Congress also authorized the Treasury Department to issue
regulations to ensure that companies would not circumvent the
purpose behind the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.60
The question of when a spin-off represents an inappropriate
circumvention of Congress’s repeal of the General Utilities doctrine has
been a point of continual discussion in the literature.61 So, any analysis
leave corporate solution and to take a stepped-up basis in the hands of the transferee
without the imposition of a corporate level tax. Thus, the effect of the rule is to grant
a permanent exemption from the corporate income tax.”); id. at 282 n.28 (“The price
of this basis step up is, at most, a single, shareholder-level capital gains tax (and
perhaps recapture, tax benefit, and other similar amounts). In some cases, moreover,
payment of the capital gains tax is deferred because the shareholder’s gain is reported
under the installment method.”). For contemporaneous statements in favor of
retaining the General Utilities doctrine, see Walter J. Blum, Behind the General Utilities
Doctrine, or Why Does the General Have so Much Support from the Troops, 62 TAXES 292, 293–
95 (1984); Bernard Wolfman et al., Taxing Corporate Distributions of Appreciated Property:
Repeal of the General Utilities Doctrine, Relief Measures and Entity Reclassification Proposals,
22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 77, 83–85 (1985); see also Reform of Corporate Taxation: Hearing
before the S. Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong. 148–49 (1983) (statement of John S. Nolan).
57. See Don Leatherman, The Scope of the General Utilities Repeal, 91 TAXES 235, 237
(2013). Calls for the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine began almost at the time of
its codification. See, e.g., H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., A PROPOSED NEW
TREATMENT FOR CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS AND SALES IN LIQUIDATION 1643, 1649–50
(Comm. Print 1959) (authored by James B. Lewis).
58. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2269
(1986) (amending I.R.C. §§ 311(b)(2) and 336(a)).
59. H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, at 204 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4292 (“The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine is designed to
require the corporate level recognition of gain on a corporation’s sale or distribution
of appreciated property, irrespective of whether it occurs in a liquidating or
nonliquidating context.”); see also George K. Yin, General Utilities Repeal: Is Tax Reform
Really Going to Pass it by?, 31 TAX NOTES 1111, 1112 (1986) (proposing the repeal of the
General Utilities doctrine, which later became law in 1986 with the enactment of sections
336, 337, and 338 of the Internal Revenue Code).
60. See I.R.C. § 336(d)(1)(A) (1988).
61. There are rich scholarly discussions of section 355 where various reform
proposals have been set forth and are worthy of serious consideration. See, e.g., Herbert
N. Beller, Tax-Free Corporate Separations: The Tug of War Continues, U. S. CAL. L. CTR. TAX
INST. § 200 (1992); Canellos, supra note 19, at 423; J. William Dantzler Jr., Spinoffs: Still
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of the appropriate scope of section 355 must begin with this
organization question: How should section 355’s continued existence
be harmonized with Congress’s over-arching goal of repealing the
General Utilities doctrine? As part of its decision to repeal the General
Utilities doctrine, Congress had to address the appropriate scope of
section 355 both in 1986 and in subsequent legislation. Unfortunately,
in 1986, Congress initially chose to leave section 355 unchanged. This
was a missed opportunity. However, the legislative history in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 indicates why Congress believed section 355 should
remain in the tax law, and thus represents a good place to start to
understand how Congress rationalized section 355’s continued
existence in the post-General Utilities era:
Congress felt that the same policy rationale that justifies
nonrecognition by the shareholder on receipt of the stock—namely,
that the transfer merely effects a readjustment of the shareholder’s
continuing interest in the corporation in modified form and subject
to certain statutory and other constraints—also justifies
nonrecognition of gain (or loss) to the distributing corporation in
this situation.62

With the benefit of hindsight, Congress’s failure to reform section
355 in 1986 was a mistake, and the subsequent statutory amendments
to section 355 in the post-1986 era demonstrate that Congress has
recognized that section 355’s statutory provisions must be harmonized
with its larger effort to repeal the General Utilities doctrine. But, even
so, the above justification for retaining section 355 is instructive:

Remarkably Tax Friendly, 129 TAX NOTES 683, 683 (2010); Melissa C. McCann, Section
355 in a Post-General Utilities World: The Victim of an Overreaction?, 23 J. CORP. TAX’N
137 (1996); Schler, supra note 54, at 240; Daniel M. Schneider, Internal Revenue Code
§ 355 Before and After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: A Study in the Regulation of Corporate Tax
Bailouts, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 567, 569 (1986); Michael L. Schultz, The Evolution of the
Continuity of Interest Test, General Utilities Repeal and the Taxation of Corporate
Acquisitions, 80 TAXES 229, 229 (2002); Jeffrey T. Sheffield & Herwig J. Schlunk,
Reconciling Spin-Offs with General Utilities Repeal, 74 TAXES 941, 941 (1996); Simon &
Simmons, supra note 44, at 291; Lewis R. Steinberg, Selected Issues in the Taxation of
Section 355 Transactions, 51 TAX LAW. 7, 7–8 (1997); George K. Yin, A Different Approach
to the Taxation of Corporate Distributions: Theory and Implementation of a Uniform CorporateLevel Distributions Tax, 78 GEO. L.J. 1837, 1924 (1990) (“In sum, the traditional focus of
the device clause has been not on testing whether there has been a constructive
withdrawal of corporate earnings (and contribution of new capital), but rather on the
character of those earnings in the hands of the distributee, once withdrawn.”); Yin,
supra note 44, at 289–90; Zolt, supra note 12, at 819.
62. STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 337 (Comm. Print 1987).
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Congress believed that a readjustment of the continuing interest of
historic shareholders in historic businesses should be afforded
nonrecognition treatment.63 But, after giving a shout-out for that core
fact pattern that deserved nonrecognition treatment in the postGeneral Utilities era, Congress did not seek to revisit whether section
355, in its then existing statutory construct, might afford
nonrecognition treatment to transactions that resembled a disposition
of a business to new shareholders in contravention of the intended
scope of its General Utilities repeal.64
Since Congress did not resolve the question of how to harmonize
section 355 with its broader effort to repeal the General Utilities doctrine
in 1986, a rich debate has ensued about the appropriate scope of
Congress’s General Utilities repeal.65 A “weak form” of General Utilities
repeal holds that Congress’s repeal of the General Utilities doctrine is
fulfilled as long as assets remain with a carryover basis in corporate
solution so that corporate level taxation is deferred, but not
permanently avoided.66 In contrast, a “strong form” of General Utilities
repeal holds that Congress did not intend nonrecognition treatment
for assets that are transferred to new shareholders who are outside of
the historic economic group.67 Section 355 lies at the heart of this
debate, and the fact that Congress did not reexamine section 355’s
scope left this debate unresolved in 1986.

63. Id.
64. It is inexplicable that Congress did not take up this challenge because significant
scholarship at the time was devoted to the notion of whether and to what extent section
355’s scope should be expanded or curtailed as part of the repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine. See, e.g., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT—SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS ON
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS 104 (AM. LAW INST. 1982); Peter L. Faber et
al., Income Taxation of Corporations Making Distributions with Respect to Their Stock, 37 TAX
LAW. 625, 626 (1984) (discussing the recommendations of the General Utilities Task
Force); Edward J. Hawkins, A Discussion of the Repeal of General Utilities, 37 TAX LAW. 641,
644–45 (1984); John S. Nolan, Taxing Corporate Distributions of Appreciated Property: Repeal
of the General Utilities Doctrine and Relief Measures, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 97, 97 (1985);
Bernard Wolfman, Corporate Distributions of Appreciation Property: The Case for Repeal of the
General Utilities Doctrine, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 81, 85–87 (1985).
65. See Zolt, supra note 12, at 832 (demonstrating multiple interpretations of the
scope of the General Utilities repeal and Congress’s failure to solve the matter in 1986).
66. See FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT—SUBCHAPTER C, supra note 64, at 116–17
(advancing the view that the exception includes a “transfer of assets in which basis
carries over to the corporate transferee”).
67. See Zolt, supra note 12, at 822 (listing a presently used rubric of the competing
“strong form” and “weak form” versions of Congress’s General Utilities repeal).
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However, this debate needs to incorporate what can and should be
gleaned from Congress’s repeated amendments to section 355 over the
intervening period from 1987 through 2016. Both the statutory
amendments to section 355 since 1986, and the legislative history from
the numerous amendments from 1987 to 2016, demonstrate that
Congress had a steadfast desire to enact a “strong form” of repeal
despite a lack of clarity from Congress during the 1986 repeal.68 Yet,
even though Congress’s legislative amendments and the
accompanying legislative history demonstrate an effort to enact a
“strong form” of General Utilities repeal, the statutory amendments
failed to fulfill Congress’s stated “strong form” policy goals. The
discontinuity that exists between the explicit “strong form” version of
Congress’s General Utilities repeal that motivated Congress’s passage of
these amendments, contrasted with the ineffectiveness of the actual
statutory amendments in achieving those “strong form” goals, has
caused section 355 to evolve in a chaotic fashion.69
The initial category of transactions that caused Congress to believe
that section 355 could be used as a means to circumvent its efforts to
repeal the General Utilities doctrine involved an acquirer corporation
that purchased stock of a target corporation and then caused the target
corporation to distribute its low-basis assets to the purchasing
corporation via the distribution of a subsidiary’s stock, which held
those appreciated assets. In Revenue Ruling 74-5,70 the IRS ruled that
an acquiring corporation that had purchased stock in a distributing
corporation two years prior to the spin-off of a controlled subsidiary’s
stock could constitute a historic shareholder, and thus could qualify
for section 355 treatment even though the shareholder had not owned

68. See id. at 822–23 (showing that Congress did not resolve the question in 1986 as
to whether it endorsed a “strong form” or “weak form” of its efforts to repeal the General
Utilities doctrine).
69. Although the literature suggests divergent prescriptions on how to reform
section 355, the authors broadly agree that section 355 needs fundamental reform. See
Schler, supra note 54, at 240 (“The spinoff rules in [section] 355 and related sections
are in many respects illogical, complex and uncertain. The rules disqualify some
transactions that logically should be permitted and permit other transactions that
logically should be disqualified. Moreover, the complexities and uncertainties are so
great that spinoff ruling requests are reported to represent more than half the
workload of the entire IRS corporate division. Congress, the Treasury Department,
and the IRS have devoted considerable attention to spinoffs in recent years, yet few
would say that this has made the rules simpler, more rational or more certain.”).
70. Rev. Rul. 74-5, 1974-1 C.B. 82 (as made obsolete by Rev. Rul. 89-37, 1989-1 C.B. 107).
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stock in the distributing corporation for five years.71 This ruling
provided a pathway for a corporate purchaser to acquire stock in a
target corporation and then break-up and sell the target corporation’s
ownership structure72 without incurring corporate level taxation.
This transaction is not objectionable under a “weak form” of General
Utilities repeal as the assets held in corporate solution retain a carryover
basis. However, this transaction is objectionable under a “strong form”
of General Utilities repeal because historic assets are being transferred
outside the economic group to new shareholders without incurring
corporate level taxation. Thus, this transaction created an early acid
test for determining the correct form (a “weak form” or “strong form”)
of General Utilities repeal that Congress intended, and Congress quickly
responded by asserting that section 355’s usage in this context was
inconsistent with its repeal of the General Utilities doctrine as it
inappropriately allowed a new shareholder (an acquiring corporation)
to obtain ownership of a historic business without the corporation
incurring corporate level taxation on the disposition.73 This outcome
was seen as analogous to the results sought by the so-called mirror
transactions that were being lauded as a means for corporate
purchasers to acquire target assets from a target corporation without
incurrence of corporate level gain.74 Thus, Congress was forced to
immediately recognize that the efficacy of its General Utilities repeal in
1986 was hamstrung by a variety of tax provisions that pre-dated its
General Utilities repeal and still provided a pathway for bust-up
transactions where a target corporation’s assets could be transferred to
a new acquirer without incurrence of corporate level taxation.
Thus, in 1987, Congress decided to address the so-called mirror
transaction75 by amending section 337(c), and, at the same time, it
addressed the so-called cousin-of-mirror transaction76 by enacting section

71. Id.
72. The acquiring corporation would be able to allocate its cost basis in the target
corporation’s stock to the stock in the controlled subsidiary and the retained stock in
the target corporation based on their relative fair market value per section 358.
73. Rev. Rul. 89-37, 1989-1 C.B. 107–08.
74. See Lee A. Sheppard, Mirror Transactions Go Forward, 35 TAX NOTES 1057, 1057
(1987); Lee A. Sheppard, Room Full of Mirrors: Enforcing General Utilities Repeal, 33
TAX NOTES 281, 281 (1986).
75. For a more detailed explanation of this transaction and its implications with
respect to the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, see Zolt, supra note 12, at 825–27.
76. For a more detailed explanation of the cousin-of-mirror transaction and its
implications with respect to the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, see Lynne A.

470

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:447

304(b)(4). During this same period, the Treasury Department utilized its
regulatory authority under the consolidated return regulations to address
the son-of-mirrors technique.77 It was in this larger context that Congress
decided that section 355 must also be reformulated so that it did not
provide an inappropriate means to circumvent Congress’s intended
Schewe, Consolidated Return Regs. Duck Many Issues Involving Application of Section 304, 77
J. TAX’N 162, 163 (1992).
77. The son-of-mirror transaction involved a situation in which an acquiring
company would acquire the stock of a target company at fair market value. After the
acquisition, the acquiring company would cause the target company to distribute its
wanted assets to the acquirer, thus generating gain within the acquirer’s consolidated
group. The transaction increased the acquirer’s basis in the stock of the target by the
amount of that gain. The acquirer then could sell the target’s stock at a time when
the target company held only unwanted assets. As a result, an artificial loss was created
that approximated the amount of the previously recognized gain that occurred upon
the distribution of the wanted assets out of the target. The IRS immediately responded
to the son-of-mirror technique by issuing I.R.S. Notice 87-14, 1987-1 C.B. 445, stating
that it would deny the intended tax benefits of a son-of-mirror type transaction by
future regulations that would have retroactive effect. On September 19, 1991, the IRS
and Treasury Department published Treasury Regulation § 1.1502-20 (the loss
disallowance rule). T.D. 8364, 1991-2 C.B. 43–44. On July 6, 2001, in Rite Aid Corp.
v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2001), the Court held that the
duplicated loss provisions of the loss disallowance rules were an invalid exercise of
regulatory authority. Because only the loss duplication provision of Treasury
Regulation § 1.1502-20 was at issue in Rite Aid, the IRS believes that the finding of
invalidity applied only to that factor and not to the factors dealing with the son-ofmirror problem. See I.R.S. Notice 2002-11, 2002-1 C.B. 526 (“It is the Service’s position
that the Rite Aid opinion implicates only the loss duplication aspect of the loss
disallowance regulation . . . .”). In response to the Rite Aid decision, the IRS and
Treasury Department promulgated two regulations to replace the loss disallowance
rules. The first, Temporary Treasury Regulation § 1.337(d)-2T (2002) (temporary
General Utilities regulation), was published on March 12, 2002, to address the
circumvention of General Utilities repeal. See T.D. 8984, 2002-1 C.B. 668. The second,
Temporary Treasury Regulation § 1.1502-35T (2003), was published on March 14,
2003, to address the inappropriate duplication of loss. See T.D. 9048, 2003-1 C.B. 645.
T.D. 9048 also included certain related provisions promulgated under Temporary
Treasury Regulation § 1.1502-21T (2010) and Temporary Treasury Regulation
§ 1.1502-32T (2003). Id. On March 3, 2005, the temporary regulation was adopted
without substantive change as final Treasury Regulation § 1.337(d)-2T (2005). See T.D.
9187, 2005-1 C.B. 778. On September 17, 2008, the IRS and Treasury Department
issued final unified rules for loss on subsidiary stock through Treasury Regulation
§ 1.1502-36 (2008). See T.D. 9424, 2008-2 C.B. 1012. For a discussion of the final
unified loss disallowance regulations that now represent the end of this sordid tale, see
Friedel, supra note 4, at 33 (“To call these final rules complicated would be a great
understatement.”). For a thorough analysis of the final regulations, see Leatherman,
supra note 4. For a detailed analysis of the evolution of the consolidated loss disallowance
regulations and the need for such regulations in order to prevent circumvention of
Congress’s General Utilities repeal, see Leatherman, supra note 57, at 237.
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scope of its repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.78 This larger context is
instructive in understanding the over-arching “strong form” repeal efforts
that motivated all of these reforms and simultaneously guided the reform
efforts with respect to section 355.
In this regard, in June of 1987, the Joint Committee on Taxation
provided a comprehensive report to the House Ways and Means
Committee that set forth areas where the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was in
need of technical corrections including the following potential reform:
Arguments for the proposals
5. The rules permitting tax-free distributions of corporate stock
were intended to apply in cases where there was a mere
readjustment of a shareholder’s continuing interest in a
corporation in modified form. This rationale is not present
where the shareholder has recently acquired its interest in the
distributing corporation through a taxable acquisition, or
where the shareholder sells the distributed stock without having
held it for a substantial period of time.
Possible Proposals
6. Permit nonrecognition in a divisive distribution of corporate
stock only if the stock distributed is directly or indirectly owned
by the distributee shareholders for a specified period of time
(e.g., 5 years) before or after the distribution.79

The Joint Committee on Taxation’s observations on section 355 are
instructive on multiple levels. First, the Joint Committee on Taxation
clearly believed that the General Utilities repeal was the general rule and
that dispositions of historic businesses to new shareholders was
intended to be taxable at the corporate level after Congress had
repealed the General Utilities doctrine.80 Second, the Joint Committee
on Taxation envisioned section 355 as a narrow exception to the
broader General Utilities repeal.81 In this regard, section 355 was limited
to allowing historic shareholders to separate their continuing
investment in historic businesses in a modified corporate form.82 And
78. Leatherman, supra note 57, at 241.
79. STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAX’N & STAFF OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
100TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS TO INCREASE REVENUES PREPARED FOR
THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 172–73 (Comm. Print 1987).
80. See id. at 171–72.
81. See id. at 172 (“[T]he distribution must not be a device for the distribution of
earnings and profits.”).
82. See id. (“For example, a new shareholder who recently acquired the
distributing corporation in a taxable transaction could still receive a qualified section
355 stock distribution.”).
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third, the Joint Committee on Taxation envisioned that section 355
should only apply to historic shareholders who owned their investment
for a significant period of time before and after the corporate
separation.83 Thus, the Joint Committee on Taxation set forth the
parameters for a “strong form” of General Utilities repeal.
But, in 1987, Congress only acted in part on the Joint Committee on
Taxation’s recommendations while whole-heartedly endorsing the
“strong form” policy formulation. Specifically, Congress amended
section 355(b)(2)(D) to disqualify from section 355 any treatment of
a distribution of stock in a controlled subsidiary to a shareholder who
had acquired control of the distributing corporation within five years
of the spin-off.84 This legislation is grounded upon a “strong form” of
General Utilities repeal that the Joint Committee on Taxation had
enumerated earlier that year. Congress clarified in this legislation that
the tax-free spin-off of a controlled subsidiary to a new acquiring
shareholder was akin to a sale of the controlled subsidiary as the
following legislative history makes plain:
The committee believes that the requirements of section 355 of the
Code should generally prevent the use of that section to accomplish
a sale of recently distributed subsidiary (or its recently acquired
parent) without corporate level tax, or effectively to accomplish a
sale of a subsidiary to any significant shareholder by a distribution
with respect to recently purchased stock.85

Thus, the normative policy concern that motivated Congress to
amend section 355 in 1987 was a situation where a historic active
business was being transferred to a non-historic shareholder. Section
355’s application in this context was seen as inconsistent with the
repeal of the General Utilities doctrine as it allowed a disposition of a
historic business to a new shareholder without incurring corporate
level tax on the disposition.86 Congress saw this outcome as
83. Id. at 173.
84. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203,
§ 10223(c), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-411–12 (1987).
85. H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 1083 (1987), as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313–
378, 2313–697. For a further discussion of the policy implications of this congressional
action, see Schler, supra note 54, at 246–47.
86. See The legislative Congress explicitly rejected mere carryover of basis as a
sufficient goal for Section 355 in the following statement when it amended Section
355(b)(2)(D). H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 1081–83 (“[Tlhe statute specifically rejects the
concept that recognition can be deferred merely because the underlying assets of the
subsidiary do not obtain a stepped-up basis. This is because the potential for a
corporate-level tax in the future, resulting from the low basis of the assets, is not the
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inconsistent with its General Utilities repeal even though the corporate
assets retained a carryover basis at the corporate level. Thus, this
legislative enactment indicates that Congress fundamentally had
rejected a “weak form” of General Utilities repeal. Congress was
comfortable with section 355 affording nonrecognition treatment to
corporate separations of historic active businesses among the historic
shareholders. However, with that said, Congress also did not want
section 355 to be used as an inappropriate device for circumventing
the intended scope of its General Utilities repeal. And, in this context,
Congress enacted section 355(b)(2)(D) to promote a “strong form” of
General Utilities repeal and articulated its desire for a “strong form”
version of General Utilities repeal as its justification for adopting this
amendment to section 355.
A second key aspect of section 355(b)(2)(D)’s enactment was
Congress’s desire to have an objective pre-transaction continuity of
interest period. In this regard, in the context of a transaction that was
akin to a disposition, Congress explicitly provided in section
355(b)(2)(D) that the shareholder who obtained control must be a
shareholder for five years prior to the section 355 transaction in order
to be considered a historic shareholder.87 Thus, Congress decided to
clarify the testing period by setting forth a predetermined and
objective five year time period in lieu of relying on the subjective “old
and cold” analysis88 that had been employed.
Congress should be commended for responding so quickly and for
clarifying its intentions in terms of the scope of its General Utilities
repeal, but even so, the resulting statutory amendment failed to
economic equivalent of a current tax on the appreciation at the time of the sale or
distribution . . . . [Section 355] might be used to claim a stepped-up, fair market value
basis when a subsidiary of an acquired corporation is distributed to the acquiring
corporation. The committee believes that section 355 of the Code should generally
prevent the use of that section to accomplish a sale of a recently distributed subsidiary
(or its recently acquired parent) without corporate level tax, or effectively to
accomplish a sale of a subsidiary to a significant shareholder by a distribution with
respect to recently purchased stock.”); see also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1987, § 10223(b)–(c), 101 Stat. at 1330-411–12; Schler, supra note 54, at 246–47
(discussing further the policy implications of the amendment to section 355).
87. See I.R.C. § 355(b)(2)(D) (2012).
88. Prior to this date, the continuity of interest standard was expressed as a
subjective standard. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(c) (2002). And, the IRS had held that
two years was sufficient for purposes of meeting this test. See Rev. Rul. 74-5, 1974-1 C.B.
82–83. With the enactment of section 355(b)(2)(D), transactions that had been
described as a disposition now required the corporate purchaser to be a five-year
historic shareholder to avail itself of Section 355. See Rev. Rul. 89-37, 1989-1 C.B. 107.
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implement the full breadth of the Joint Committee on Taxation’s
original recommendations for how to implement a “strong form” of
repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.89 Again, Congress clearly saw
that section 355 should not provide a tax advantage for a bust-up
transaction that resembled a disposition of a historic business to new
shareholders because a transaction in that context is more akin to a
disposition. The legislative history accompanying this 1987 reform
explicitly endorsed a “strong form” version of General Utilities repeal.
Even though the policy rationale that motivated Congress’s 1987
reform effort can be correctly gleaned from a normative perspective,
the statutory amendment to section 355 that Congress enacted in 1987
was clearly too narrowly tailored to effectuate its stated “strong form”
policy goals. In this regard, Congress’s amendment to section
355(b)(2)(D) did not provide for any post-transaction continuity
requirement as envisioned by the 1987 Joint Committee on Taxation
proposal.90 Moreover, although Congress’s 1987 section 355(b)(2)(D)
amendment did apply a five year testing period, that five-year testing
period only applied to a purchasing shareholder—like the one posited
in Revenue Ruling 74-5—that obtained control, as defined in section
368(c), through a taxable purchase of the distributing corporation’s
stock.91 In other words, the amendments to section 355(b)(2)(D) did
not prevent section 355 from applying to a purchasing corporation
that acquired less than eighty percent of the stock of a target
corporation and then subsequently exchanged the target stock for
stock in a controlled subsidiary two years later in a section 355
distribution.92 Thus, the amendment to section 355(b)(2)(D) sought to
restrict the tax-free spin-off of a controlled subsidiary to a non-historic
shareholder, but section 355(b)(2)(D), as drafted, was underinclusive
in terms of meeting that policy goal. The obvious planning technique,
therefore, was for the acquiring corporation to acquire a less than eighty
percent interest in the target corporation and then spin-off a controlled
subsidiary to the new shareholder thereafter.

89. See I.R.C. § 355(b)(2)(D).
90. See id.
91. See Rev. Rul. 89-37, 1989-1 C.B. 107 (discussing rationale for the 1987
amendments and that the amendment of section 355(b)(2)(D) was explicitly designed
to reverse the holding of Revenue Ruling 74-5).
92. See Alan S. Kaden & Richard A. Wolfe, Spin-Offs, Split-Offs, and Split-Ups: A
Detailed Analysis of Section 355, 44 TAX NOTES 565, 575 (1989); Michael L. Schler,
Avoiding the Technical Requirements of New Section 355, 38 TAX NOTES 417, 417–18 (1988).
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Thus, the 1987 enactment of section 355(b)(2)(D) provides an
interesting juxtaposition. On the one hand, Congress expressed in its
1987 legislative history a clear desire to limit the scope of section 355
so that a new purchasing corporation could not use it to distribute a
controlled subsidiary out of the target corporation without corporate
level gain because this technique circumvented the intended scope of
Congress’s repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.93 Moreover,
Congress sought to provide an objective five year pre-transaction
historic shareholder test that would apply in the context of a
disposition described in section 355(b)(2)(D)—a policy prescription
premised on an effort to promote a “strong form” General Utilities
repeal, as no change would have been necessitated by a “weak form” of
General Utilities repeal given that assets would have remained with a
carryover basis in corporate solution. But, even with these additions,
the statutory language that Congress enacted to amend section
355(b)(2)(D) did not restrict its application to dispositions to all new
shareholders but only restricted its application with respect to those
new shareholders that acquired eighty percent of the target
corporation’s stock before the section 355 spin-off.94 Thus, Congress’s
underinclusive response in 1987 left significant opportunities for new
purchasers to acquire an interest in a target corporation and then bustup that corporation via a distribution of a controlled subsidiary in
transactions that resembled a disposition and yet did not technically
run afoul of the amendments to section 355(b)(2)(D). As the following
discussion will confirm, the need for further legislative amendments
since the 1987 amendment indicates that Congress recognizes that its
amendment to section 355(b)(2)(D) in 1987 was underinclusive in
terms of achieving a “strong form” version of General Utilities repeal.95
As a result, in 1990, Congress returned to its desire to right-size
section 355’s scope so that it did not provide an inappropriate means
to circumvent its repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. The legislative

93. See Rev. Rul. 89-37, 1989-1 C.B. 107 (discussing the rationale for the 1987
amendments and the reversal of Revenue Ruling 74-5).
94. Congress amended I.R.C. section 355(b)(3) in 2006 to make it easier for
holding company structures to qualify for the active trade or business test. See Pub. L.
No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2963 (2006). This aspect of section 355’s evolution is beyond
the scope of this Article and addressed elsewhere. See, e.g., Jasper L. Cummings, Jr.,
The New Section 355(b) Active Trade or Business Proposed Regulations, 107 J. TAX’N 74
(2007). For the regulations that implement these rules, see T.D. 9435, 73 Fed. Reg.
75,946 (Dec. 15, 2008).
95. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-881, at 340–41 (1990).
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history in its 1990 amendment to section 355 is remarkably similar in
terms of stating Congress’s overall desired “strong form” version of its
General Utilities repeal as the following excerpt indicates:
The Committee is concerned that some corporate taxpayers may
attempt, under present-law rules governing divisive transactions, to
dispose of subsidiaries in transactions that resemble sales . . . . The
avoidance of corporate level tax is inconsistent with the repeal of the
General Utilities doctrine . . . . The provisions for tax-free divisive
transactions under section 355 were a limited exception to the
repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, intended to permit historic
shareholders to continue to carry on their historic corporate
businesses in separate corporations . . . . The present-law provisions
granting tax-free treatment at the corporate level are particularly
troublesome because they may offer taxpayers an opportunity to
avoid the general rule that corporate-level gain is recognized when
an asset (including stock of a subsidiary) is disposed of. 96

The legislative history could not be more clear in terms of supporting
a “strong form” of General Utilities repeal. This 1990 legislative history
clearly expresses the belief that section 355 is “a limited exception” to
the broad intended scope of Congress’s repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine. This 1990 legislative history also asserted that the limited
nonrecognition exception provided by section 355 was intended “to
permit historic shareholders to continue to carry on their historic
corporate businesses in separate corporations.”97 The above legislative
history clarifies that Congress was comfortable with affording
nonrecognition treatment under section 355 for a corporate
separation of historic businesses between historic shareholders, but
Congress did not want the nonrecognition treatment afforded under
section 355 to extend to transactions that resemble a disposition of a
historic business to new shareholders outside the historic economic
group.98 Moreover, Congress also reiterated its desire to utilize a fiveyear pre-section 355 transaction testing period for situations that
resembled a disposition. Thus, Congress was motivated by a desire to
96. Id. In enacting section 355(d), Congress also consciously refused to allow
nonrecognition treatment for carryover basis transactions. In addition, the above
excerpt makes clear that Congress was searching for a means to differentiate between
a corporate separation of historic businesses among historic shareholders and a
corporate separation that allowed businesses to transfer to new owners in violation
with the intended repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. For a further discussion of
the policy implications of this congressional action, see Schler, supra note 54, at 247.
97. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-881, at 341.
98. See id.
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ferret out transactions that resembled a disposition and utilized an
objective five-year pre-transaction time frame to determine historic
shareholders in lieu of the more subjective “old and cold” standard.99
However, just as it had done in 1987, Congress adopted an
amendment to section 355 that yet again was too narrow to achieve its
explicitly stated “strong form” policy goal. Specifically, Congress added
a new section 355(d), which provided that a corporate level (but not a
shareholder level) recognition event would occur on a distribution of
subsidiary stock in a section 355 transaction if after the distribution, a
shareholder holds a fifty percent or greater interest in the distributing
corporation or in a distributed subsidiary due to a stock interest that
was acquired “by purchase” within five years of the section 355
transaction.100 Under a “weak form” of General Utilities repeal, section
355(d) would not have been necessary as assets remain in corporate
solution with a carryover basis. But, under a “strong form” of General
Utilities repeal, section 355(d) is justifiable exactly because historic
business assets are being transferred to new shareholders outside of
the historic economic group in a transaction that avoids corporate
level taxation with respect to the disposition.
The policy implications of section 355(d)’s adoption cannot be
more clear: Congress wanted to effectuate a “strong form” of General
Utilities repeal such that historic assets that are disposed to new
shareholders would not avoid corporate level taxation. However, this
provision does not specify any post-separation continuity requirement.
As a further defect, section 355(d) does not solely rely on whether a
spin-off occurred as part of a fifty percent or more ownership change
to a new shareholder. Yes, section 355(d) looks to whether there has
been a fifty percent or greater ownership change within five years prior
to the section 355 transaction, but then it limits section 355(d)’s
applicability to only those ownership changes that occur “by purchase”
within that five-year period. In other words, section 355(d) does not
restrict corporate level nonrecognition treatment for a new shareholder
who acquires stock in a tax-free manner.101 The statute provides its own
list of new shareholder stock acquisitions that are not treated as having
arisen “by purchase,”102 and also gives the Treasury Department
authority to provide further exceptions to the “by purchase”
99. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (2012).
100. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11321, 104
Stat. 1388, 1388–460–63 (1990).
101. See I.R.C. § 355(d)(3)–(5).
102. See § 355(d)(3).

478

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:447

designation.103 Additionally, the Treasury Department has provided
further instances when a new shareholder can acquire stock and not be
viewed as having acquired that stock “by purchase.”104 By not simply
looking at whether or not a corporate separation under the auspices of
section 355 resulted in a historic business being transferred to nonhistoric—or non-five year—shareholders regardless of how that new
shareholder acquired its interest, Congress missed a golden opportunity
to provide a straightforward rule that would have prevented section
355’s application if the corporate separation effectuated a transfer of a
historic business to a non-historic shareholder.
After section 355(d)’s enactment, a distributing corporation could
still spin-off a subsidiary that contained an “unwanted business” to its
historic shareholders and then the historic shareholders could
exchange their stock in the distributing corporation for stock in an
acquiring corporation in a qualifying tax-free reorganization. In this
situation, the pre-merger spin-off transaction could side-step the
amendments to section 355(d) if the acquiring corporation acquired
stock in either the distributing corporation or in the controlled
subsidiary by a means other than “by purchase.” This could be
accomplished via an acquisitive tax-free reorganization as that form of
acquisition was not “by purchase” within the meaning of section
355(d).105 Thus, a corporate separation could qualify by reason of
nonrecognition treatment at the corporate level by reason of section
355 even though that corporate separation is coupled with an
acquisitive reorganization where a historic businesses is transferred to
a new shareholder group. This technique of engaging in a pre-merger
spin-off of a subsidiary followed by a subsequent acquisitive
reorganization of the distributing corporation by the unrelated
acquiring corporation is commonly referred to as a “Morris Trust”
transaction.106 Moreover, a reverse-Morris Trust transaction was also
authorized under the pre-1997 law as long as the controlled subsidiary’s
103. See § 355(d)(9)(B).
104. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-6(D) (2018).
105. For an in-depth analysis of section 355(d)’s scope, see Mark J. Silverman et al.,
The Proposed Section 355(d) Regulations: Narrowing the Scope of an Overly Broad Statute, 26
J. CORP. TAX’N 269 (2000).
106. The transaction takes its name from the transaction that was blessed in
Commissioner v. Mary Archer W. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966). Further
IRS regulations have expounded the Morris Trust technique and defined what
constitutes an adequate business purpose for engaging in a pre-merger spin-off. See,
e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-603, 1968-2 C.B. 148; Rev. Rul. 70-434, 1970-2 C.B. 83; Rev. Rul. 78251, 1978-1 C.B. 89; Rev. Proc. 96-30, 1996-1 C.B. 696, 712.
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post spin-off merger was approved in a subsequent vote after the spinoff of the controlled subsidiary that was not contingent as to its
acceptance or occurrence at the time of the spin-off. 107
Several high-profile transactions occurred after section 355(d)’s
enactment that demonstrate its deficiencies in fulfilling a “strong
form” version of General Utilities repeal, but none was more influential
in galvanizing the discussion than Viacom’s corporate separation and
disposition of its cable business to a new owner, TCI.108 By way of
background, Viacom International, a subsidiary of Viacom, historically
had conducted several businesses including a cable business, and TCI
wanted to acquire only the cable business.109 In a leveraged reverseMorris Trust transaction, Viacom International borrowed $1.7 billion110
and then transferred all of its non-cable historic business assets and the
$1.7 billion of cash proceeds to a new subsidiary (Viacom Services) that
it spun-off to its parent, Viacom.111 Thus, after this first series of steps,
Viacom International had additional infused debt of $1.7 billion and
only the historic cable business.112 Viacom then split-off Viacom
International to certain shareholders in exchange for their Viacom
stock.113 The Viacom International shareholders then agreed to
exchange their Viacom International stock for nonvoting preferred
stock, while TCI invested $350 million into Viacom International for
all of its common stock.114 The IRS ruled that the Viacom Services spinoff and the subsequent Viacom International split-off both qualified
for section 355 treatment even though these corporate separations
facilitated the disposition of the Viacom cable business in a tax-free
107. See Rev. Rul. 98-27, 1998-1 C.B. 1159 (stating that the IRS would not apply a
Court Holdings or step transaction doctrine to determine continuity if the outcome of
public shareholder vote was uncertain at the time of the spin-off of the controlled
subsidiary); Rev. Rul. 98-44, 1988-2 C.B. 315 (obsoleting earlier rulings that would have
resequenced the steps to disqualify section 355 from applying in a reverse-Morris Trust
fact pattern where the controlled subsidiary was first the subject of a spin-off followed
by a subsequent merger of the controlled subsidiary for purposes of disqualifying the
spin-off from receiving section 355 treatment).
108. For a historical debate and competing views on the contours of the Morris Trust
transaction, compare George K. Yin, Morris Trust, Sec. 355(e), and the Future Taxation of Corporate
Acquisitions, 80 TAX NOTES 375, 376, 378 (1998), with Schler, supra note 54, at 240–41.
109. Viacom sells cable system to TCI, UPI (July 25, 1995), https://www.upi.com/
Archives/1995/07/25/Viacom-sells-cable-system-to-TCI/1859806644800.
110. See TCI Pacific Communications, Inc., (Form S-4/A) at 28–29 (June 19, 1996).
111. Id. at 25–33.
112. Id. at 32–33.
113. Id. at 47.
114. Id.
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manner to a new shareholder, namely TCI, in a transaction that
resembled a disposition.115 The added debt infused into Viacom
International followed by the split-off of Viacom International at a time
when Viacom International only held the historic cable business
allowed the Viacom shareholders to keep Viacom Services with $1.7
billion of loan proceeds and allowed TCI to acquire control of Viacom
International, which had the cable businesses and $1.7 billion of new
debt. Thus, the transaction economically resulted in Viacom’s historic
cable business being disposed of to a non-historic shareholder—
namely, TCI—with the Viacom shareholders retaining Viacom Services
and $1.7 billion of loan proceeds, which monetized their interest in
the cable business all under the auspices of section 355.
Viacom’s successful leveraged Morris Trust transaction created
immediate reaction in the press,116 and the success of this transaction
called into question the efficaciousness of the IRS’s assertion that it
would apply a Court Holdings analysis to an overall plan where a section
355 spin-off was coupled with a subsequent acquisition.117
None of these transactions are objectionable under a “weak form”
of General Utilities repeal as corporate assets retain a carryover basis at

115. See id. at 25–33, 112–13 (providing the transaction steps including the
leveraging aspects of the transaction including an additional $1.7 billion of new debt
and then states that the transaction received a private letter ruling from the IRS stating
that the transaction qualified for section 355 treatment). The private ruling that
appears to have favorably ruled on this transaction appears to have been I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 96-37-043 (June 17, 1996).
116. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Aliens Kidnap IRS Lawyers: Inexplicable Viacom Ruling,
96 TAX NOTES 129-6 (1996).
117. See Rev. Rul. 96-30, 4.05, 1996-1 C.B. 36 (“[T]he management of the
distributing corporation, to its best knowledge, is not aware of any plan or intention
on the part of any particular remaining shareholder or security holder of the
distributing corporation to sell, exchange, transfer by gift, or otherwise dispose of any
stock in, or securities of, either the distributing or controlled corporation after the
transaction”); Lee A. Sheppard, IRS Rules in Favor of Viacom, Ignoring Its Own Guidance, 71
TAX NOTES 1728 (June 24, 1996). For a helpful review of the historic transactions, see
Richard L. Reinhold, Section 355(e): How We Got Here and Where We Are, 82 TAX NOTES
1485, 1485–89 (1999). A similar leveraged spin-off was announced in early 1997
involving General Motors $3.9 billion leveraged spin-off of its Hughes Aircraft subsidiary,
and another high-profile leveraged spin-off occurred involving Capital Cities transfer of
ABC to a new leveraged subsidiary that was eventually acquired by Disney while Capital
Cities was later merged into Knight Ridder. See General Motors Corp. (Form S-4/A) at
89–91 (Oct. 17, 1997) (stating that the IRS had issued a private letter ruling stating that
the spin-off of Hughes Defense qualified for Section 355 treatment). The IRS confirmed
that the leveraged spin-off qualified as tax-free under section 355. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
98-02-048 (July 11, 1997); see also Reinhold, supra note 117, at 1490.
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the corporate level. However, these transactions are objectionable
under a “strong form” of General Utilities repeal because these
transactions allow section 355 to be used as a means to effectuate a
leveraged tax-free disposition of a historic business to non-historic
shareholders while avoiding corporate level taxation. The combination
of the leveraging of a controlled subsidiary or of the distributing
corporation prior to a corporate separation that qualifies for section 355
treatment followed by the acquisition of one of the separated
corporations by a new economic group in an acquisitive tax-free
reorganization allows the former shareholders to transfer a historic
business to new shareholders, to retain financial assets for a substantial
portion of the value of the transferred corporation, and to do so in
avoidance of any corporate level taxation. A corporate separation in
this context resembles a disposition, and the re-leveraging aspect of
the transaction allows historic shareholders to partially monetize or
cash-out of their investment in a historic business. Thus, section 355’s
applicability in this context constitutes a device for historic
shareholders to monetize, or cash-out, of their interest in the historic
business assets in a tax-free manner.
The above results that are obtainable under section 355(d) provide
an interesting juxtaposition. On the one hand, Congress enacted a
provision that can only be understood in terms of a “strong form” of
General Utilities repeal. In fact, the legislative history accompanying the
enactment of section 355(d) Congress explicitly endorsed a “strong
form” version of General Utilities repeal and explicitly stated that
nonrecognition treatment should not be given for corporate
separations of historic businesses to non-historic shareholders. But,
instead of enacting a statutory amendment that clearly and
comprehensively denied section 355 treatment for any ownership
change that occurred during the five years prior to the section 355
transaction, and instead of affording a bright-line post-transaction
continuity period, section 355(d) only requires corporate level gain if
there is a new shareholder who acquires their new stock ownership “by
purchase” within the five-year period preceding the section 355
transaction.118 Further, section 355(d) did not address the tax-free
monetization techniques that allowed a historic shareholder to cashout of their interest in a historic business in a tax-free manner under
the rubric of section 355.

118. See I.R.C. § 355(d)(3)–(5) (2012).
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In response to these transactions and section 355(d)’s objective
failure to effectuate a “strong form” of General Utilities repeal, Congress
should have amended section 355(d) to provide that corporate level
gain should arise for any section 355 transaction that occurs whenever
there has been a fifty percent ownership change in either the
distributing corporation or the distributed subsidiary regardless of
whether that ownership change occurred “by purchase” or otherwise.
In addition, Congress should have provided that the excess leveraging
aspects of these corporate separations should create a deemed taxable
stock dividend to the extent that the shareholders have “cashed-out”
of their proportionate interest in historic business assets.
But, instead of either of these responses, Congress chose to enact a
new section 355(e) that again was underinclusive in terms of
addressing Congress’s now familiar “strong form” policy goal that has
guided its General Utilities repeal efforts in the post-1986 period. Before
looking at the actual scope of section 355(e), it is informative to look
at the legislative policy goals that were set forth as the motivation for
Congress’s enactment of new section 355(e) as those policy goals help
to evaluate the intended scope of the repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine. In this regard, the 1997 House Report makes clear that
section 355, “was intended to permit the tax-free division of existing
business arrangements among existing shareholders” only. 119 It was
not intended to allow nonrecognition treatment for the transfer of
historic businesses to non-historic shareholders through any means
that resemble a disposition.120
Thus, the legislative history in 1997, consistent with the legislative
history in 1987 and 1990, stated emphatically that section 355’s
intended scope was to allow a limited nonrecognition exception for a
corporate separation of historic businesses among historic
shareholders. The 1997 House Report contrasts that limited context
with Congress’s broader General Utilities repeal effort that sought to
prevent nonrecognition treatment for corporate separations that

119. See S. REP. NO. 105-33, at 139–40 (1997); H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 462 (1997); J.
COMM. ON TAX’N, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN
1997 198 (Comm. Print 1997). The Conference Report states a similar understanding of
section 355 in terms of not allowing a corporate separation to non-historic shareholders.
In their view, section 355 provides an exception to this rule for certain “spin-off” type
distributions of stock of a controlled corporation. It applies to acquisitions and
dispositions of stock of the distributing corporation or the controlled corporation prior
and subsequent to a distribution. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-220, at 527 (1997).
120. S. REP. NO. 105-33, at 139–40 (1997).
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facilitate the transfer of a historic business to new shareholders, which
the legislative history characterized as a transaction that “more closely
resembles a corporate level disposition.”121 Thus, the legislative history
represents a full-throated and clear endorsement of the “strong form”
of General Utilities repeal.
Yet, after giving due regard to Congress’s explicit endorsement of a
“strong form” version of General Utilities repeal as its rationale for
section 355(e)’s enactment, one must then recognize the disconnect
that exists between the “strong form” policy goals set forth in the
legislative history to section 355(e) and the actual substantive
legislation that Congress enacted. In this regard, section 355(e)
provides that the distributing corporation must recognize corporate
level gain but no shareholder level gain is required for any spin-off that
effectuates a fifty percent or greater ownership change to new
shareholders that arise “pursuant to a plan or series of related
transactions.”122 Thus, section 355(e) does attempt to determine
whether non-historic shareholders acquire a more than fifty percent
interest in either the distributing corporation or the controlled
corporation and endorses the goal of not allowing section 355 to be
used to circumvent the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
Moreover, in an improvement over section 355(d), section 355(e) does
not seek to determine a non-historic shareholder’s status by whether
or not a new shareholder acquired its interest “by purchase.”123 Thus,
on its face, section 355(e) is premised on effectuating a “strong form”
of General Utilities repeal.
In addition, as a further improvement over prior legislative efforts,
section 355(e) sets forth a post-separation continuity testing period of
two years,124 thus providing for a bright-line post-continuity
requirement as envisioned in the 1987 Joint Committee on Taxation’s
121. H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 462 (1997).
122. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1012, 111 Stat. 1788, 914–16
(1997); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 462–63. A number of public deals have sought
to avoid section 355(e)’s application by ensuring that the distributing corporation’s
shareholders maintain more than fifty percent of the stock of the distributed corporation
and the distributing corporation after the spin-off any and a subsequent acquisitive
reorganization after the spin-off. See, e.g., Hewlett Packard Enter. Co. (Form 8-K) 1 (May
24, 2016) (disclosing spin-off of its computer service business to Everett and then
Computer Science Corporation acquires less than fifty percent ownership of Everett in a
subsequent reverse Morris Trust transaction where the Hewlett Packard shareholders
retained more than fifty percent of the stock of Everett).
123. Compare I.R.C. §§ 355(e)(2)(A), (e)(3)(A) (2012), with § 355(d)(3).
124. See § 355(e)(2)(B).
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recommendation. In transactions that Congress believed could
represent a disposition, it specifically added a two-year post-section 355
separation testing period. Again, an explicit post-transaction continuity
of interest testing period furthers the goal of ensuring that a corporate
separation only represents a readjustment of the continuing interest of
historic shareholders in the historic business. These prescriptions harken
back to a desire to effectuate a “strong form” of General Utilities repeal.
Nevertheless, notwithstanding these improvements over section
355(d), section 355(e) has its own unique set of deficiencies in terms of
implementing Congress’s effort to implement a “strong form” of General
Utilities repeal. First, section 355(e) uses a different time period for
purposes of determining a historic shareholder than does section
355(b)(2)(D) and section 355(d): namely a period that commences two
years before and ends two years after the section 355 spin-off. Second,
section 355(e) only targets a corporate separation that effectuates an
ownership change of either the distributing corporation or the controlled
corporation as part of a “plan or series of related transactions.”125
The determination of whether a subsequent ownership change and
an earlier section 355 corporate separation are part of a prohibited
“plan or series of related transactions” has become a subjective
quagmire. Treasury regulations set forth a list of nonexclusive factors
that tend to show the existence or nonexistence of a prohibited “plan
or series of related transactions” at the time of the section 355
transaction.126 The Treasury Department regulations require a factual
determination of whether the ownership change and accompanying
section 355 transaction are part of a common plan or arrangement and
seek to identify, among other things, whether “substantial negotiations”
for an acquisition occurred during the two year period ending on the
date of the spin-off distribution.127 And, these regulations provide
specific safe harbors and operating rules.128
Revenue Ruling 2005-65129 is a helpful ruling to demonstrate the
downgrade that has occurred. In this ruling, the IRS considered a
situation where a controlled subsidiary’s spin-off was publicly
announced for valid business reasons prior to the commencement of
discussions with an acquiring corporation. After the spin-off had been
announced but before it had been consummated, the distributing
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See id.
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(3) (2018).
§ 1.355-7(b)(2).
§ 1.355-7(b)(4).
Rev. Rul. 2005-65, 2005-2 C.B. 684, 685.
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corporation began negotiations and agreed to be acquired by an
acquiring corporation in an acquisitive reorganization where the
acquirer’s shareholders would obtain fifty-five percent of the stock in
the resulting combined company. Thus, Revenue Ruling 2005-65
posits a situation where new shareholders receive a historic business
within two years of a section 355 transaction. Moreover, the acquisitive
reorganization that involved the distributing corporation was agreed
to prior to the spin-off of the controlled subsidiary. Thus, a historic
business is posited to be transferred in a tax-free manner to new
shareholders in a transaction that is akin to a disposition. Yet, the IRS
ruled that the spin-off, which facilitated the ultimate disposition of the
distributing corporation, was entitled to section 355 nonrecognition
treatment because the section 355 transaction was publicly announced
prior to any actual negotiations with the acquiring corporation with the
consequence that no prohibited “plan (or series of transactions)” existed
at the time of the initial section 355 transaction’s announcement.130
Revenue Ruling 2005-65, therefore, provides a well understood roadmap
for how one can transfer a historic business to new shareholders in a
transaction that resembles a disposition but avoids running afoul of
section 355(e).131
Revenue Ruling 2005-65 may be correctly decided in terms of
interpreting section 355(e)’s provisions as statutorily enacted, but the
result obtained under this revenue ruling is objectionable because it
allows section 355 to be used as an inappropriate device for circumventing

130. Id.
131. See Alcoa Inc., Tax Matters Agreement (Form 8-K) 26 (Oct. 31, 2016) (showing
that the distributing corporation and the controlled subsidiary had the following
representation and restriction after a spin-off: “during the period beginning two years
before the Distribution Date and ending on the Distribution Date, there was no
‘agreement, understanding, arrangement, substantial negotiations or discussions’ (as
such terms are defined in Treasury Regulations Section 1.355-7(h)) by any one or
more officers or directors of any member of the UpstreamCo Group or by any other
person or persons with the implicit or explicit permission of one or more of such
officers or directors regarding an acquisition of all or a significant portion of the
UpstreamCo Capital Stock (and any predecessor)”; see also Yum China Holdings, Inc.,
Tax Matters Agreement (Form 8-K) 22 (Oct. 31, 2016) (providing in section 7.03 of a
tax separation agreement that the controlled subsidiary, after its spin-off, will not
engage in any issuance of stock that would not satisfy the safe harbors of Reg. § 1.3557(d)(8) or (9)); Versum Materials, Inc., Tax Matters Agreement (Form 8-K) 5, 16, 17
(Sept. 29, 2016) (showing a tax separation agreement in section 4.3 restricts the
controlled subsidiary that will be spun-off from having a fifty percent ownership
change unless the acquisition of the controlled meets the safe harbors to section
355(e) for public companies provided in Treas. Reg. § 1.355-7(d)(8) and (9)).
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Congress’s “strong form” version of repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
From a normative perspective, section 355 treatment should be denied if
a corporate separation allows a historic business to be transferred to new
shareholders within section 355(e)’s two-year testing period. Instead of a
straightforward approach, section 355(e) provides an escape hatch to
section 355(e)’s application for a transaction that transfers a historic
business to non-historic shareholders that occur within the prescribed
section 355(e) testing period as long as the corporate separation was not
part of a common “plan or series of related transactions,” even though a
disposition to new shareholders occurred in that testing period. This
subjective “plan or series of transactions” analysis creates planning
opportunities and subjectivity in applying section 355(e) that undercuts
the policy of restricting section 355’s application to only corporate
separations of historic businesses among historic shareholders that
actually maintain their interest in the distributing corporation and the
controlled subsidiary for the entire testing period.
Section 355(e) provides yet another interesting juxtaposition. On
the one hand, section 355(e)’s statutory provisions make sense only in
the context of a “strong form” of General Utilities repeal, and in fact, the
legislative history accompanying section 355(e)’s adoption explains
section 355(e) in terms of ensuring that section 355 treatment should
not afford nonrecognition treatment to corporate separations of
historic businesses to non-historic shareholders. The legislative history
then further states that section 355 was intended to be a “limited
exception” that should not apply when either the distributing
corporation or the controlled corporation are transferred to new
shareholders as that scenario more closely resembles a “disposition”
and not simply a readjustment of the historic shareholder’s continuing
interest in the historic businesses.132 Furthermore, “[i]n cases in which
it is intended that new shareholders will acquire ownership of a
business in connection with a spin-off, the transaction more closely
resembles a corporate level disposition of the portion of the business
that is acquired.”133 These statements represent a clear endorsement
of a “strong form” version for defining the scope of Congress’s General
Utilities repeal. Yet the actual statutory language of section 355(e)
conditions its application on a subjective determination of whether a
132. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 462 (1997) (describing the similarities of new
shareholders acquiring a business with a corporate level disposition); see also STAFF OF
THE J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX LEGISLATION
ENACTED IN 1997 198 (Comm. Print 1997) (quoting same language).
133. H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 462; S. REP. NO. 105-33, at 139–40 (1997).
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prohibited “plan or series of related transactions” exists.134 This
condition precedent limits the efficacy and certainty of section
355(e)’s statutorily prescribed two-year continuity of interest testing
period even in the context where section 355 is facilitating a
disposition of a historic business to non-historic shareholders within
that prescribed testing period. Instead of conditioning section
355(e)’s applicability on a subjective determination of whether a
prohibited “plan or series of related transactions” existed, Congress
should have simply stated that a corporate separation does not qualify
for section 355 treatment if the effect of the transaction is to transfer
the ownership of the distributing corporation or the controlled
subsidiary to non-historic shareholders within a specified timeframe as
originally suggested by the Joint Committee on Taxation in 1987.
In 2005, Congress became concerned about so-called “cash rich”
split-offs that occur as part of a fifty percent or greater ownership
change.135 When either the distributing corporation or the controlled
subsidiary has more than two-thirds of its value attributable to
investment assets, and when a shareholder obtains a fifty percent or
greater interest in a disqualified investment corporation as a result of
the corporate separation, then the corporate separation is denied
nonrecognition treatment under section 355(g).136 Thus, if a
substantial majority of the value of a corporation after a corporate
separation relates to non-historic business assets, then the principle
reason for the spin-off is attributable to factors other than separating
the historic business between historic shareholders. Section 355(g) is
consistent with Congress’s goal of not allowing section 355 to represent
a device for circumventing the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
However, section 355(g) has several deficiencies. First, section 355(g)

134. Reinhold, supra note 117, at 1492, 1496.
135. Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222,
§ 507, 120 Stat. 345, 358–59 (2006). For a further analysis of cash rich spin-offs, see
Robert S. Bernstein, Janus Capital Group’s cash rich split-off, 30 CORP. TAX’N 39 (2003); see
also Lee Sheppard, NYSBA Considers ‘Cash Wreck’ in Spinoffs, 114 TAX NOTES 507 (2007);
Robert Willens, Can STI Efficiently ‘Monetize’ Its KO Stake?, 120 TAX NOTES 601, 602 (2008);
Robert Willens, Does the Tribune Decision Endanger Cash-Rich Split-offs?, 109 TAX NOTES
547, 548 (2005); Robert Willens, Endgame May Be in Sight for Untangling Ties of Liberty
Media, News Corp., 194 DAILY TAX REP. J-1 (2006); Robert Willens, Ending Entanglements
Through a ‘Cash-Rich’ Split Off, 126 TAX NOTES 243 (2010); Robert Willens, Liberty Media
Will Engage in ‘Cash-Rich’ Split-Offs, 42 DAILY TAX REP. 41, 43–44 (2007); Robert Willens,
Weyerhaeuser Blazes New Trails in Spinoff Techniques, 115 TAX NOTES 497 (2007); Robert
Willens, Windstream Will Split Off Its Yellow Pages Business, 114 TAX NOTES 573 (2007).
136. See I.R.C. § 355(g)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
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does not apply if the transaction represents a spin-off where no
shareholder group increases its proportionate interest in the
disqualified investment by fifty percent or more.137 Second, the tainted
investment asset threshold is “a relatively high level . . . so that only
super cash-rich split-offs need fear this provision.”138 Instead of this
high threshold, Congress should have restricted section 355’s
application to only corporate separations that involve principally
historic business assets.
In 2015, Congress again became concerned about section 355’s usage
in the context where a controlled subsidiary is distributed in a section 355
transaction and either the distributing corporation or the controlled
subsidiary subsequently elect real estate investment trust (REIT) status.
The combination of a tax-free corporate separation under section 355
coupled with a REIT election with respect to one of the corporations
involved in the section 355 transaction allows assets to permanently leave
corporate solution after the subsequent REIT election without incurring
corporate level tax.139 Initially, the IRS had issued favorable section 355
rulings for the “spin-REIT” transaction, finding that a controlled
subsidiary’s real estate activities could satisfy the active trade or business
standard of section 355 through its real estate management activities and
once distributed could elect REIT status.140 In 2015, the Treasury
Department reversed its course and stated that it now had concerns about
a section 355 spin-off that is followed by either the distributing
corporation or the controlled subsidiary making a REIT election after the

137. Id.
138. See BITTKER ET AL., supra note 10, at ¶11.02[2][f].
139. I.R.S. Notice 2015-59, 2015-40 C.B. 459.
140. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 12-73-348 (Sept. 13, 2013) (describing the process
a company took to meet REIT status). Apparently, at least fifteen REIT spin-offs were
concluded between 2010 and 2015 including a large transaction involving Darden
Restaurants and a significant transaction involving Hilton Hotels. See Robert Rizzi, 30
Years’ War: General Utilities Repeal and Efforts to Enforce It, 43 J. CORP. TAX’N 23 (2016).
For representative disclosures of publicly announced Spin-REIT transactions, see Park
Hotels & Resorts Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2–3 (Jan. 2, 2017) (disclosing
section 355 spin-off of Hilton real estate properties into a separate company); Vornado
Realty Trust, Current Report (Form 8-K) 8 (Oct. 31, 2016) (setting forth intent to spinoff JBG Smith in a qualifying section 355 transaction followed by JBG Smith electing
REIT status); MSG Spinco, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 157 (Sept. 16, 2015)
(announcing a section 355 spin-off a controlled subsidiary that would own all of the
Madison Square Garden sports and entertainment segments).

2018]

REFORM OF SECTION 355

489

spin-off.141 Shortly thereafter, on December 18, 2015, Congress enacted
section 355(h) and section 856(c)(8).142
Under section 355(h), a REIT generally will be ineligible to
participate in a tax-free spin-off as either the distributing corporation
or controlled corporation unless those corporations were already
REITs or the corporate separation would be subjected to corporate
level taxation.143 In addition, if a corporation is a party to a section 355
transaction, then that corporation is not eligible to make a REIT
election for ten years from the date of the section 355 transaction.144
Even with the passage of section 355(h), the Treasury Department was
concerned that this statutory provision, by itself, did not fully protect
against the ability of taxpayers to combine a section 355 transaction
with a subsequent REIT or RIC election.145 Thus, in order to protect
against an inappropriate circumvention of Congress’s repeal of the
General Utilities doctrine, the Treasury Department issued regulations on
June 7, 2016 that would cause a corporation that merged into a REIT
within ten years of its participation in a section 355 transaction must
recognize all of the corporate-level built-in gain at the time of its REIT
conversion.146 The Treasury Department arguably could have solved
this recalibration of Section 355 with its very broad delegated authority,
but it left it to Congress to make statutory changes to recalibrate Section
355. But, the Treasury Department, albeit late in doing so, has started
to use its original legislative grant of authority to now independently
reform Section 355 as more fully discussed in the next section.

141. See I.R.S. Notice 2015-59, 2015-40 C.B. 459 (describing the Treasury
Department’s concerns around the section 335 spin-offs); see also Rev. Proc. 2015-43,
2015-40 C.B. 467, 468 (describing how the IRS similarly announced that it would no
longer provide a favorable ruling under section 355 with respect to transactions where
either the distributing corporation or the controlled corporation elected REIT or RIC
status after the section 355 transaction and that transaction).
142. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, Div. Q, 129 Stat.
2242, 3040 (2015).
143. Id. at 3090.
144. Id. at 3090–91.
145. See Certain Transfers of Property to Regulated Investment Companies [RICs]
and Real Estate Investment Trusts [REITs]; Correction, 81 Fed. Reg. 41,800 (proposed
June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (imposing a tax on transactions where
property of a C corporation converts to the property of an REIT).
146. Treas. Reg. § 1.337(d)-7T(f) (2017).
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C. Treasury Department’s Use of its Delegated Authority to Recalibrate the
Device Test to Address General Utilities Repeal
Although Congress has sought to repeatedly amend section 355, it
should be understood that the Treasury Department has long held
sufficient authority to reform section 355. In 1986, Congress gave the
Treasury Department broad authority to ensure that its purpose in
repealing the General Utilities doctrine would not be circumvented
through any other provision of law, including section 355.147 In 1989,
the Treasury Department substantially expanded its regulatory
guidance under section 355, but those regulations did not include any
guidance under its authority to prevent the circumvention of the
repeal of the General Utilities doctrine under section 3337(d) because
the IRS was still developing its position with respect to those matters.148
In addition, in 1990, Congress, in its legislative history to section
355(d)’s enactment, reminded the Treasury Department that it had
broad regulatory authority that it should independently use to ensure
that the intended scope of its repeal of the General Utilities doctrine was
not circumvented even when Congress concurrently tries to address
the same concern statutorily;149 the Treasury Department has recently
endorsed this broad grant of authority in the section 355 context.150
Thus, regardless of Congress’s legislative enactments, the Treasury
Department has broad authority to restrict section 355’s scope to
ensure that it is not used as a means to circumvent Congress’s General
147. See I.R.C. § 337(d) (2012) (outlining the authority the Secretary of the
Treasury shall have to carry out sections of the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
148. See General Utilities Repeal, 54 Fed. Reg. 289 (Jan. 5, 1989) (stating that “[t]he
Internal Revenue Service is developing regulations under section 337(d) of the Code
that will relate to the distribution of stock, or stock and securities, of a controlled
corporation. New § 1.355-6 is revised for this purpose”).
149. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-881, at 342 (1990) (“The bill [that enacted section
355(d)] is not intended to limit in any way the continuing Treasury Department
authority to issue regulations to prevent the avoidance of the repeal of the General
Utilities doctrine through any provision of law or regulations, including section 355.”);
see also I.R.C. § 337(d)(1) (showing the broad grant of regulatory authority to
implement Congress’s desire to repeal the General Utilities doctrine).
150. See I.R.C. § 337(d); see also General Utilities Repeal, 81 Fed. Reg. 45,963, 46,009
(proposed July 15, 2016) (stating that “the Treasury Department and the IRS are
concerned that certain taxpayers may be interpreting the current regulations under
sections 337(d) and 355 in a manner allowing tax-free distributions motivated in whole
or substantial part by a purpose of avoiding corporate-level taxation of built-in gain in
investment or nonbusiness assets”); I.R.S. Notice 2015-59, 2015-40 C.B. 459 (observing
that taxpayers may attempt to use section 355 distributions in ways that are inconsistent
with the purpose of the General Utilities repeal).
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Utilities repeal. But, notwithstanding this longstanding authority, the
Treasury Department has been slow to act in the section 355 context.151
Nevertheless, in 2016, the Treasury Department became much more
active in terms of utilizing its regulatory authority to address taxpayer
efforts to utilize section 355 to circumvent Congress’s General Utilities
repeal, and so 2016 may represent a turning-point year. In this regard,
the 2016 proposed Treasury Department regulations provide that the
existence of nonbusiness assets and disproportionate allocation of
nonbusiness assets in the corporate separation can represent an
evidence of device.152 Thus, these regulations signal that the Treasury
Department has started to reformulate the device test so that it focuses
on the corporate level (General Utilities repeal) concerns of whether or
not a corporate separation represents a device for inappropriately
circumventing Congress’s repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.153
This Article’s reform proposals with respect to refocusing the device
test on corporate level concerns, as set forth in Section II.A, are
consistent with the Treasury Department’s reformulation of the device
test to focus that standard on the goals of ensuring the “strong form”
of General Utilities repeal.
The impetus for these 2016 proposed regulations appears to have
been the highly publicized potential spin-off by Yahoo of a subsidiary
that would own the Yahoo investment in Alibaba stock.154 In this
proposed spin-off, substantially all of the market value of the
controlled subsidiary would be attributable to a passive investment in
Alibaba stock, not the de minimis active trade or business that Yahoo
would transfer into that controlled subsidiary.
Historically, the IRS had interpreted section 355(b)’s active trade or
business requirement as being satisfied regardless of the size of the
historic active trade or business assets in comparison to the
nonbusiness assets held by each of the distributing corporation or the

151. See Annette Ahlers, Section 355 Guidance: More Clarity and New Tests on Device,
Active Trade or Business and Distribution of Control, JDSUPRA (July 20, 2016), https://www.
jdsupra.com/legalnews/section-355-guidance-more-clarity-and-22310 (describing the
limitations and shortages in resources to manage responses to section 355 inquiries).
152. See Comments Regarding Device, 81 Fed. Reg. 46,008 (July 15, 2016)
(describing the factors used to determine the evidence of device).
153. See supra note 150 (discussing how the Treasury Department in 2016 issued regulations
under section 337(d) to further circumscribe the so-called “spin-REIT” technique).
154. See Marie Sapirie & Amy S. Elliott, New Device Test Included in Proposed Hot Dog Stand
Regs, 152 TAX NOTES 326, 327 (2016) (describing a tax-free spin-off plan by Yahoo Inc.).
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controlled corporation.155 For ruling purposes, the IRS had previously
required that the controlled corporation’s active trade or business
assets either must represent at least five percent of the total assets of
the newly separated entity or must not be “de minimis” under a facts
and circumstances analysis,156 but this ruling guideline was eliminated
in 2003.157 The proposed Yahoo spin-off raised this question: Would Ms.
Gregory have won in front of Judge Learned Hand or in front of Justice
Sullivan if she had ensured that the Averill corporation had owned an
actively run hot dog stand in addition to the Monitor stock investment?158
In a reversal of its ruling practice, after the announcement of the
proposed Yahoo spin-off of its Alibaba investment, the IRS announced
that it may have policy concerns with a spin-off transaction that involves
a controlled subsidiary with a relatively small active trade or business
and a relatively large amount of investment assets.159 Concurrently
with this announcement, the IRS reinstituted its no-rule policy with
respect to spin-off transactions where the active trade or business assets
represent less than five percent of the controlled corporation’s assets
and also indicated that it would not rule in situations where (1) the fair
market value of the investment assets is two-thirds or more of the value
of the gross assets, (2) the fair market value of the active trade or
business assets is less than ten percent of the value of the investment
assets, and (3) the ratio of the fair market value of the investment assets
to the value of the gross assets is three or more times greater than the
comparable ratio of the other corporation.160 Furthermore, in
proposed regulations issued in July 2016, the Treasury Department
155. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(2)(iii) (2016) (stating that “[g]enerally, the
corporation is required itself to perform active and substantial management and
operational functions” and that this determination would be made based on an
analysis “from all the facts and circumstances”); see also Rev. Rul. 73-234, 1973-1 C.B.
180 (finding that the corporation itself directly performs active and substantial
management and operational functions due two employees and that this was sufficient
to find that the corporation was engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business).
156. See Rev. Proc. 96-43, 1996-2 C.B. 330 (describing the process of establishing
active trade requirement of section 355(b)).
157. See Rev. Proc. 2003-48, 2003-2 C.B. 86, 87 (noting when a letter ruling will not
be issued on whether active business requirements are met).
158. See Amy S. Elliott, Does Size Matter? Getting to Will on a Hot Dog Stand ATB, 148 TAX NOTES
128, 132 (2015) (describing the growing number of transactions regarding ATB issues).
159. See I.R.S. Notice 2015-59, 2015-40 C.B. 459 (stating that the IRS is studying this
issue); Rev. Proc. 2015-3, 2015-1 C.B. 129, 133 (adding two specific issues in the section
355 context in which the IRS will not rule).
160. See Rev. Proc. 2015-43, 2015-2 C.B. 467, 468 (noting three new situations where
the IRS will not rule).
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stated that it would revise its existing regulations to provide that the
distributing corporation and the controlled corporation must each
hold active trade or business assets that comprised at least five percent
or more of their total assets.161 The Treasury Department explained
that a corporate separation must involve an economically significant
amount of active business assets in order for nonrecognition treatment
to be consistent with congressional intent, case law, and the underlying
purpose of the reorganization provisions and circumvents Congress’s
desire to repeal the General Utilities doctrine.162 Consequently, the
Treasury Department concluded that existing section 355 regulations
should provide more objective guidance regarding the device factors
where a corporate separation involves predominantly non-historic or
nonbusiness assets.163 Thus, it now appears that the Treasury
Department finally has riveted its attention on the question of how the
device test and the active business test should be refocused on the
corporate level policy concern of Congress’s repeal of the General
Utilities doctrine.164 The Treasury Department should be commended
for asserting that the device test should be used to promote a “strong
form” of General Utilities repeal and for recognizing that corporate
separations that involve substantial nonbusiness assets or a
disproportionate separation of nonbusiness assets can inappropriately
circumvent the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
The proposed regulations, however, fall far short of achieving the
laudable expressed goal of providing for a “strong form” of General
Utilities repeal. First, the proposed regulations state that the ownership
of nonbusiness assets by the distributing corporation and/or the
controlled corporation is evidence of a device, but the weight afforded
to this new device factor is determined largely on a facts and

161. See Minimum Percentage of Five-Year Active-Business Assets, 81 Fed. Reg.
46,018 (July 15, 2016) (adding § 1.355-9 as a proposed regulation).
162. See Comments Regarding Active Business, 81 Fed. Reg. 46,008 (July 15 2016)
(describing the divergence from congressional intent by allowing section 355(b) to be
met through insignificant active businesses); see also Sapirie & Elliott, supra note 154,
at 326 (showing an early reaction to these new proposed regulations).
163. See Supplementary Information, 81 Fed. Reg. 46,005, 46,008 (July 15, 2016)
(showing the Treasury Department’s determination that regulations should be clearer
for determining device factors).
164. See Amy S. Elliott, Will New Spinoffs Require General Utilities Repeal Compliance?,
151 TAX NOTES 879, 879–80 (2016) (quoting Robert Wellen, IRS associate chief
counsel, stating that the IRS is concerned with so-called hot dog stand fact patterns
and wants to issue guidance but are still working through the issues).
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circumstance basis.165 The proposed regulations then state that the
larger the percentage of nonbusiness assets in either corporation, the
stronger the evidence of a device.166 In contrast, if neither the
distributing corporation nor the controlled corporation has
nonbusiness assets that comprise twenty percent or more of its total
assets, the ownership of nonbusiness assets ordinarily would not be
evidence of a device.167 In addition, a difference in the nonbusiness
asset percentages for the distributing corporation and the controlled
corporation ordinarily would not be evidence of a device if such
difference is less than ten percentage points.168 Finally, the proposed
regulations then provide a “per se device” standard.169
Thus, an interesting juxtaposition can be seen when one compares
the actual regulatory enactment with the policy goals set forth in the
preamble that motivated these proposed regulations. In this regard,
the preamble indicates that nonbusiness assets can represent a device,
but the proposed regulations do not foreclose a section 355 treatment
where either or both the distributing corporation or the controlled
corporation have a majority (fifty-one percent) of their assets as
nonbusiness assets.170 The proposed regulations will not ordinary treat
this situation as a device—even if substantially all of the assets of both
the distributing corporation and the controlled corporation are
nonbusiness assets—as long as the percentage of nonbusiness assets is
within ten percentage points of the assets of the distributing
corporation and the controlled corporation.171 In addition, because
the device test still focuses on spin-offs, some practitioners have already
165. § 1.355-2 Limitations, 81 Fed. Reg. 46,014 (July 15, 2016).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. The proposed regulations provide that a per se device exists if either the
distributing corporation or the controlled corporation has nonbusiness assets that
comprise two-thirds or more of its total assets; one corporation has nonbusiness assets
comprising two-thirds or more of its total assets but less than four-fifths of its total assets
and the other corporation has nonbusiness assets that comprise less than three-tenths
of its total assets; one corporation has nonbusiness assets comprising four-fifths or
more of its total assets but less than nine-tenths of its total assets and the other
corporation has nonbusiness assets that comprise two-fifths or less of its total assets; or
one corporation has nonbusiness assets comprising nine-tenths or more of its total
assets and the other corporation has nonbusiness assets that comprise less than half of
its total assets. See Guidance Under Section 355 Concerning Device and Active Trade
or Business, 81 Fed. Reg. 46,004, 46,017.
170. See id. at 46,016.
171. See id.
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indicated that the market may well utilize split-off transactions to avoid
the applicability of the new device test whenever substantial
nonbusiness assets are being distributed as part of the corporate
separation.172 Even though the Treasury Department’s proposed
regulations are a step in the right direction, the regulatory response
has failed to fulfill the goals of the repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine. The new guidance only focuses on spin-offs and does not
categorically prevent section 355 from being used in a corporate
separation where the majority of assets of either the distributing
corporation or the controlled corporation are nonbusiness assets.
Thus, the Treasury Department’s proposed regulations fall short of
circumscribing section 355’s scope so that it cannot be used to
circumvent Congress’s repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
II. REFORM OF SECTION 355
Congress’s policy rationale for its amendments to section 355 in the
post-1986 era has been remarkably consistent in its stated preference
for a “strong form” version of repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
Congress has expressed a continuing concern about corporate
dispositions of corporate assets to new owners in transactions that are
akin to a sale but avoid corporate level taxation. Congress has
rightfully attempted to ensure that the nonrecognition provisions of
section 355 remain limited to the circumstance where the corporate
separation merely serves to readjust the continuing interest of historic
shareholders in historic active business assets. The amendments to
section 355 since 1986 can be framed and understood in the context
of furthering that policy goal so that the direction of the law in the
section 355 context is now apparent in terms of advancing towards the
normative goal of a “strong form” of General Utilities repeal.
Notwithstanding the clarity of understanding the direction of the
reform efforts to section 355 and how those efforts have moved the
existing law closer to the normative goals of a “strong form” of General
Utilities repeal, the outcome of these multiple congressional
enactments is that a patchwork of provisions now exist that provide
needless complexity and fail to provide a unified approach for
determining whether a corporate separation represents simply a
readjustment of ownership of historic businesses among historic
shareholders who intend to continue their investment in the historic
172. See Laura Davison, Tax-Free Spinoffs Would Be More Difficult Under IRS Proposal,
DAILY TAX REP. (2016).

496

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:447

businesses, albeit in modified corporate form. Section 355, as
currently constructed, overly relies on subjective standards and has
created an informal administrative working law that is not
transparently understood except by those who are deeply involved in
the ruling process.173
And, these subjective standards provide
inappropriate opportunities to utilize section 355 as a means for historic
shareholders to monetize—or cash-out—of their proportionate interest
in historic business assets and/or to transfer a historic business to nonhistoric shareholders in a tax-free manner. Section 355, therefore,
provides inappropriate planning opportunities for circumventing
Congress’s repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. The Treasury
Department’s recent efforts to reformulate the device test, albeit laudable,
also have fallen far short of implementing a “strong form” of General
Utilities repeal. Thus, it is now time for Congress and the Treasury
Department to reassess their efforts in the 1987 to 2016 time period and
seek to rationalize their efforts so that the normative goals of a “strong
form” of General Utilities repeal and needed simplification can be achieved.
The Article urges reform in two directions. First, the Treasury
Department should continue to refocus the device test174 so that it
addresses today’s corporate level policy goal of preventing appreciated
assets from leaving a corporation’s tax base in transactions that
inappropriately circumvent the scope of Congress’s “strong form”
version of repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. In this regard, the
device test should be reformed so that it more objectively differentiates
between non-objectionable corporate separations that represent a
mere readjustment of the continuing interest of historic shareholders
in historic business assets from objectionable corporate separations
that are more akin to a disposition or a monetization of a shareholder’s
interest in a historic business. This Article’s proposed reform of the
device test is set forth in Section II.A below. Once the device test is
refocused in the manner set forth in this Article, section 355(g) and

173. See Schler, supra note 54, at 240 (ascertaining that the spin-off rules of
section 355 are “illogical, complex and uncertain”).
174. Others have also argued that the device test should be refocused to promote the
goals of General Utilities repeal, and thus this Article follows a long line of other scholars.
For example, Professor Yin has found that corporate division also gives taxpayers an
opportunity for corporate-level tax advantages unseen before the transaction. The
smaller corporate structures allow for a tax-free divisive transaction, which enables the
possibility of corporate assets without corporate tax. Yin, supra note 44, at 294; see also
Schler, supra note 54, at 240 (highlighting that “the concern is that spinoffs can
improperly be used to avoid corporate level capital gain on the distribution”).
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the subjective device factors set forth in existing Treasury Regulation’s
section 1.355-2(d) can be eliminated as obsolete.
In addition, Congress identified non-historic shareholders in
conflicting ways in section 355(b)(2)(D), section 355(d), and section
355(e). Those conflicting provisions also use subjective tests that
frustrate their transparent application and afford taxpayers an
opportunity to utilize section 355 to circumvent Congress’s expressly
stated “strong form” version of General Utilities repeal. Thus, in Section
III.B, this Article argues that section 355(d) and section 355(e) should
be repealed and proposes that a harmonized testing period should be
set forth in a new section 355(d). Under the new section 355(d) as
envisioned in this Article, section 355(d) would provide a unified
ownership change standard that borrows heavily from the objective
standards set forth in section 382. This aspect of the reform proposal
is set forth in Section II.B. below. In combination, the reforms set forth
in this Part II seek to fulfill Congress’s oft-repeated “strong form”
version of General Utilities repeal and seeks to do so in a manner that
utilizes clear rules and eliminates the subjective standards that
currently inhibit the effectiveness of Congress’s prior reform efforts.
A. Reformation of the Device Test
1.

The device test should deny section 355 treatment unless more than fifty
percent of the value of both the distributing corporation and the controlled
subsidiary is attributable to historic active trade or business assets
The Treasury Department already has the authority it needs in order
to reformulate the device test to promote the corporate level policy
goal of effectuating a “strong form” of General Utilities repeal, and in
fact, the Treasury Department has started the process of doing so.175
Existing Treasury Department regulations state that section 355 should
not apply to a transaction used principally as a device for the
distribution of the earnings and profits of the distributing corporation,
the controlled corporation, or both.176 To this extent, the existing final
Treasury regulations are not objectionable. However, the Treasury
Department regulations then seek to employ a subjective facts and
circumstance analysis to implement this mandate.
In contrast to the approach taken in the existing regulations, this
Article contends that the Treasury Department should set forth in its

175. See supra Section II.C.
176. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(1) (2011).
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regulations that the device test is satisfied only if a majority of the total
assets of both the distributing corporation and the controlled
corporation constitute active historic trade or business assets.177
Congress’s core policy goal in section 355 is to allow tax-free corporate
divisions that principally involve a separation of historic businesses
among historic shareholders, like the fact pattern in Rockefeller.178
Viewed with that transaction in mind, a distribution should only qualify
for section 355 treatment if, and only if, the fair market value of the
historic active trade or business assets of each of the distributing
corporation and of the controlled corporation—judged after the
section 355 spin-off, split-off, or split-up—represents at least fifty
percent of the total asset value of each of the distributing corporation
and the controlled corporation.
If at least fifty percent of the total assets of either the distributing
corporation or the controlled subsidiary were not historic active
business assets after the corporate division, then the transaction should
run afoul of the device test because the corporate separation
principally serves as a device to separate non-active assets out of
common corporate solution in avoidance of the intended scope of
Congress’s repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. In the post-General
Utilities era, a tax-free corporate distribution should not be allowed
under section 355 unless the principal assets in both the distributing
corporation and the controlled corporation are historic active business
assets. When a majority of assets in either the distributing corporation
or the controlled subsidiary are not historic active business assets, then
the IRS should presume that the principal reason for the corporate
separation was to serve as a device to separate non-historic activities in
a manner that circumvents Congress’s efforts to repeal the General
Utilities doctrine. Certainly, some could argue that a lower threshold
might be justifiable.179 However, the benefit of the fifty percent historic
177. This aspect of this Article’s reform proposal was advanced as a potential reform
proposal more than a decade ago. See Schler, supra note 54, at 264–65 (stating that
“the required percentage of qualifying [active trade or business assets] should
substantially exceed 5%[;] the percentage, however, should not be too high . . . . One
reasonable possibility would be to have the required percentage for qualifying assets
set at 50%”). In that prior reform proposal, it was argued that this percentage could
be waived in appropriate circumstances, but that nuance is not adopted in this Article’s
reform proposal. This proposal has been separately advanced elsewhere as well. See
Canellos, supra note 19.
178. Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176, 180–83 (1921).
179. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(k)(2) (2007) (setting forth that a one-third interest in a
partnership is to be considered sufficient interest in historic business assets in Example 8).
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business asset threshold set forth in this Article is that it requires a
majority of the financial value of both the distributing corporation and
the controlled subsidiary to be attributable to historic business assets.
Thus, on its face, the principal consequence of the corporate separation
was simply to divide historic business assets among historic shareholders
and was not to separate out nonbusiness assets or to achieve a different
purpose. The following Example 1 sets forth the contours of this
proposed reformulated (corporate level focused) device test.
a. Example #1: substantial nonbusiness assets
Distributing corporation is only owned by historic shareholders and
owns two active trades or businesses that have been conducted for five
years as described in section 355(b): Business A (worth $8 million)
and Business B (worth $8 million). Distributing corporation also owns
nonactive trade or business assets worth $12 million. In order to
further a legitimate business purpose, the distributing corporation
forms a new controlled subsidiary, transfers Business A and $6 million
of the nonactive assets to the controlled subsidiary, and distributes all
of the stock of the controlled subsidiary to its shareholders.
This transaction meets the device test under the reform proposal set
forth in this Article. What is relevant to the device test is that the
historic active trade or business assets of both the distributing
corporation and the controlled corporation account for more than
fifty percent of the total asset value of each corporation after the spinoff,180 so this corporate division did not have a principal purpose of
separating out non-historic business assets. Rather, since more than
half of the total asset value of each of the distributing corporation and
the controlled subsidiary remains attributable to historic active trade
or business assets, the purpose for this corporate separation was not
principally a device to distribute nonbusiness assets to shareholders
but instead principally served to separate two historic active businesses
amongst the historic shareholders.
This example provides a clear case for when section 355 is not being
utilized principally as a device simply to inappropriately separate
nonbusiness assets out of common corporate solution in avoidance of

180. The “Distributing Corporation” and the “Controlled Subsidiary” each have
total assets of $14 million. As to each of them, $8 million of the asset value is
attributable to historic business assets. Thus, more than fifty percent of the fair value
of the assets of each of the Distributing Corporation and the Controlled Subsidiary are
from historic business assets.
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corporate level taxation. Here, each of the distributing corporation
and the controlled subsidiary have historic active trade or business
assets that comprise more than fifty percent of the total asset value of
each corporation after the corporate separation. Even assuming a
valid business purpose and assuming the other requirements of section
355 are satisfied, the distribution of the controlled subsidiary’s stock
by the distributing corporation should be afforded section 355
treatment because the objective facts demonstrate that over half of the
total asset value for each of the distributing corporation and the
controlled corporation is in fact attributable to historic active business
assets. Therefore, the stock distribution principally related to
separating historic businesses and did not principally serve as a device
to separate non-historic business assets.
However, if the facts were altered such that all of the investment
assets stayed with the distributing corporation or all of the investment
assets had been transferred to the controlled subsidiary, then this
revised fact pattern would have caused this Article’s articulation of the
device test to be failed because now the shareholders are receiving
stock in one of the corporations that has more than fifty percent of its
total asset value derived from nonbusiness assets.181 In this situation,
this corporate division serves principally—not entirely, but
principally—as a device to divide nonbusiness assets out of the
combined corporation without incurring corporate level taxation. In
this revised fact pattern, the distribution does not qualify for section
355 treatment because both the distributing corporation and the
controlled subsidiary must have more than fifty percent of their total
asset value attributable to historic business assets. As this example
demonstrates, the reform proposal set forth in this Article provides
objective certainty by making it clear that a corporate separation
cannot be done tax-free under section 355 if more than fifty percent
of the assets of either the distributing corporation or the controlled
corporation are nonbusiness assets. In contrast, the Treasury
Department’s proposed 2016 regulations do not categorically
foreclose this outcome. In fact, a corporate separation can involve
ninety-five percent non-active assets and still the corporate separation
would not be considered a device that was principally motivated to
181. Now, the value of the corporation that retained all of the nonbusiness assets
(whether the distributing corporation or the controlled subsidiary) is $20 million
comprised of non-historic business assets of $12 million and historic business assets of
$8 million. Thus, less than fifty percent of the fair value of the assets of the corporation
that retained all of the financial assets would relate to historic business assets.
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separate appreciated nonbusiness assets in certain fact patterns under
the 2016 proposed regulations. In addition, the proposed 2016
Treasury Department regulations require a subjective weighing of
factors that hinders their transparent application and afford planning
opportunities that frustrate the efficacy of those proposed 2016
regulations from achieving the normative policy goals that motivated
their issuance in the first place.
2.

The device test should deny nonrecognition treatment for stock if
shareholders receive excessive value due to disproportionate leverage in
either the distributing corporation or the controlled subsidiary
Even where a corporate separation involves historic active business
assets that comprise more than fifty percent of the total assets of both
the distributing corporation and the controlled corporation, the use of
section 355 can allow monetization opportunities for shareholders to
cash-out of their proportionate interest in the corporation’s aggregate
historic assets through leveraged spin-offs exemplified by the Morris
Trust transaction. Current law affords nonrecognition treatment at the
shareholder level even though these re-leveraging techniques represent
a cashing-out of the shareholder’s proportionate interest in the
aggregate historic assets. Section 355 should not provide a tax-free
means for one group of shareholders to monetize—or cash-out—of
their investment in historic business assets while allowing another group
of shareholders to enhance their proportionate interest in the historic
business assets as this usage of section 355 represents a device for
disguising what should be a taxable stock dividend under section 305 to
the shareholders.182
So, to deal with this concern, this Article proposes that the
shareholders of either the distributing corporation or the controlled
corporation, whichever the case may be, must recognize a taxable stock
dividend as part of an otherwise qualifying section 355 transaction if the
effect of the section 355 transaction is to cause the other corporation to
have “excess leverage” immediately after the spin-off. For this purpose,
excess leverage would mean a debt-to-equity ratio that exceeded 120%
182. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2)(iv)(B) (2011) (stating that differing ratios in
financial assets between the distributing corporation and the controlled corporation
does not wholly preclude evidence of a device). Proposed regulations issued in 2016
provide further objectivity but are still far more lenient than those in this proposal, which
isolates the taxable dividend impact of the transaction in a more targeted manner. See
Guidance Under Section 355 Concerning Device and Active Trade or Business, 81 Fed.
Reg. 46,004, 46,009 (July 15, 2016) (to be codified as 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
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of the average debt-to-equity ratio of the corporate affiliated group that
existed before the section 355 transaction.
Again, section 355 should afford nonrecognition treatment to the
extent it divides historic businesses amongst its historic shareholders.
But, if the parties bolt-on to the corporate separation a re-leveraging
of the corporate affiliates as part of the section 355 transaction, then
the stock associated with the monetization benefit should be treated as
a taxable stock dividend under section 305(c) that trumps section
355(a)’s applicability. The following Example 2 sets forth this Article’s
proposal for how to reform section 355 so that it does not supplant a
taxable stock dividend result under section 305 in a situation where
section 355 transaction involves re-leveraging as part of the transaction:
a. Example #2: nonrecogition treatment due to disproportionate
leveraging
The facts are the same as in Example 1 except now assume that the
corporation has $7 million of debt and so has a debt-equity ratio of thirtythree percent before the spin-off.183 In the spin-off, the distributing
corporation takes Business A, half of the non-active assets ($6 million of
the $12 million nonbusiness assets), and all of the $7 million debt. The
controlled subsidiary obtains Business B, half of the non-active assets ($6
million of the $12 million of nonbusiness assets), and no debt.
The distributing corporation and the controlled subsidiary each
conduct active trade or businesses that account for more than fifty
percent of their total assets, and these corporations are each owned by
historic shareholders after the spin-off. Thus, the spin-off in this
example does not violate the device test and otherwise qualifies for
section 355 treatment. However, even though the corporate division
otherwise qualifies for section 355 treatment, the corporate division in
this example was used as a means to shift excess leverage because the
distributing corporation has a debt-to-equity ratio of fifty percent
(assets of $14 million, debt of $7 million and equity of $7 million)
whereas the distributing corporation had a pre-separation debt-toequity threshold of forty percent (i.e., 33% x 120% limit). In this
situation, the amount of its excess leverage above a forty percent debtto-equity threshold, or $3 million, represents a taxable stock dividend
under section 305 to the shareholders of the controlled corporation

183. Assets of $28 million (Business A of $8 million; Business B of $8 million; and
nonbusiness assets of $12 million) and debt of $7 million implies equity of $21 million
for a debt-to-equity ratio of seven to twenty-one or thirty-three percent.
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who shifted excessive leverage away from their investment and in effect
cashed-out of their investment in those corporate assets.
The effect of the disproportionate leverage that exceeded the 120%
threshold is that it allowed shareholders of the controlled subsidiary to
disproportionately increase their equity in the controlled corporation’s
underlying business assets. Outside of section 355, a disproportionate
stock distribution that increases the proportionate interest of some
shareholders implicates section 305(b) and section 305(c), and section
355 should not turn-off that result. Accordingly, this re-leveraging
aspect of the transaction should be treated as a taxable stock dividend
to the benefitted shareholders who shifted their proportionate interest
in the debt away from their investment with respect to the relatively
underleveraged corporation. If the entire leverage were transferred to
the controlled subsidiary, then the distributing corporation’s
shareholders would be the ones that are the recipient of the deemed
taxable stock dividend as they would have obtained an enhanced
ownership in the historic business assets through a monetized
disposition of their interest in the historic assets that were split-off in
the controlled subsidiary.
Once these reforms are enacted, Congress could consider repealing
section 355(g) as the policy goals for its original adoption would now
have been addressed more comprehensively under this Article’s
reformulated device test.
B. New Section 355(d) and the Continuity of Interest Test
Fundamentally, section 355(b)(2)(D), section 355(d), and section
355(e) each attempt to ensure that the corporate division is afforded
tax-free treatment under section 355 when a corporate separation
occurs among historic shareholders who maintain a continuing
interest in the distributing corporation and the controlled corporation
in modified corporate form.184 Each of these provisions determine
“continuity” by prescribing a statutorily mandated continuity testing
period. But, even though these provisions seek to set forth a statutorily
based continuity of interest testing period, the ownership change
criteria used in section 355(b)(2)(D), section 355(d), and section
355(e) provides needless complexity that should be harmonized into

184. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1) (stating that “[s]ection 355 applies to a
separation that effects only a readjustment of continuing interests in the property of
the distributing and controlled corporations”).
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a coherent ownership change standard that removes the idiosyncrasies
of the various provisions.
Congress has repeatedly stated that section 355 should not apply to
corporate separations that are more akin to a disposition of historic
business assets to non-historic shareholders, and these repeated
legislative amendments demonstrate a consistent desire to enact a
“strong form” of General Utilities repeal.185 Moreover, where a
transaction resembles a disposition, Congress has repeatedly endorsed
the usage of objective testing periods to determine historic
shareholders five years prior to a section 355 transaction under section
355(b)(2)(D) and section 355(d) and a two-year post-transaction
continuity period under section 355(e). These aspects of current law
are incorporated into this Article’s new section 355(d), which provides
for a five-year pre-transaction testing period and a two-year posttransaction testing period.
Yet, even though current law utilizes objective time periods under
section 355(b)(2)(D), section 355(d), and section 355(e), those
provisions ultimately condition the applicability of those provisions on
either the acquisition of section 368(c) control, a subjective “by
purchase” transaction, or on a “plan or series of related transactions”
criteria that each in their own way limit the effectiveness of those
statutorily prescribed testing periods. The restrictive and/or subjective
criteria used in these provisions is ironic because Congress has
successfully enacted a cohesive and unified ownership change regime
in section 382 to address an analogous concern, namely the trafficking
in net operating losses to non-historic shareholders. Section 382
provides a unified approach for differentiating between historic and
non-historic shareholders, and section 382 accomplishes this task by
using an objective testing period that shuns subjective criteria.186 Thus,
in a very real sense, Congress’s duplicative efforts to define the identity
of non-historic shareholders in section 355(b)(2)(D), section 355(d),
and section 355(e) represent an effort to reinvent an already existing
wheel and does so in a haphazard and subjective manner.
The continuity of shareholder interest concerns in section 355
necessitate a determination of the identity of historic shareholders,
and the methodology for identifying historic shareholders has already
been thoughtfully addressed in section 382’s comprehensive

185. Sheffield & Schlunk, supra note 61, at 946 (noting Congress’s repeated
attempts to reconcile section 355 and the General Utilities repeal).
186. I.R.C. § 382(i)(1) (2012) (defining the testing period to a strict three-year period).
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ownership change regime. When Congress enacted section 382, it
attempted to grapple with the continuity of interest problem in a
comprehensive manner with objective criteria, and so section 355(d)
and section 355(e) should not adopt their own unique ownership
change tests that utilize subjective factors but should instead rely on
the section 382 ownership change regime. Thus, in this respect, this
Article’s reform proposal appears to be consistent with an earlier call by
Professor Yin to incorporate section 382 concepts into section 355.187
In contrast with how Congress defines ownership changes in section
382 with objective tests, the section 355 modifications since 1986 have
occurred in a piecemeal fashion, and so the existing statute utilizes
inconsistent testing periods, inconsistent tests of shareholders, and
inconsistent application of intent standards. It is time for Congress to
eliminate section 355(d) and section 355(e) and replace them with the
following new unified ownership change standard that borrows heavily
from the section 382 construct.
C. New Section 355(d)
1.

Section 355 ownership change rule
The five-year historic shareholders of the distributing corporation
must own fifty percent or more of both the distributing corporation
and the controlled subsidiary for a period that begins five years before
the section 355 transaction188 and ends two years after the section 355
transaction.189 To determine whether an ownership change has
occurred during this seven year testing period, the principles of section
382 will be utilized with the following modifications: (1) the ownership
change among historic shareholders that arises solely as a result of the
section 355 distribution will be ignored; and (2) the testing period for
determining an ownership change under section 355 will be a sevenyear period that commenced five years before the section 355
transaction and ends two years after the section 355 transaction.

187. See Yin, supra note 44, at 296–301 (grappling with the ownership change
implications and the leveraging aspects, although appearing to suggest a
reformulation of section 355 so that it is designed to better protect against
inappropriate avoidance of the General Utilities repeal by incorporating principles
enunciated in section 382).
188. See I.R.C. § 355(d)(3)(A) (omitting the “by purchase” restriction).
189. See § 355(e)(2)(B) (omitting the condition set forth in the last class of the
provision, which provides an exception for transactions that were not pursuant to a plan).
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2.

Consequences of failing continuity of shareholder interest
If an ownership change occurs with respect to either the distributing
corporation or the controlled corporation, then the effect of such an
ownership change will be that the entity that experiences the ownership
change (whether the distributing corporation or the controlled
subsidiary) must recognize in the tax year of the ownership change the
entire amount of the corporate level net unrealized built-in gain (the
NUBIG)190 that existed at the time of the section 355 distribution.191
The above proposal sets forth a comprehensive rule, providing that
the historic five-year shareholders of the distributing corporation must
continue to own at least fifty percent of the stock in the distributing
corporation and in the controlled subsidiary for at least two years after
the qualifying section 355 transaction. Section 382 does not employ
subjective standards such as a “plan or series of transactions” inquiry
or a “by purchase” inquiry. Instead, section 382 utilizes a robust set of
rules to determine owner shifts and equity structure shifts and
possesses a reasonable rule on how to handle transactions among less
than five percent shareholders. Through it all, section 382 defines and
determines the existence of an ownership change using objective
criteria, and these criteria are administrable and have had the benefit
of existing for several decades. Instead of trying to recreate another
ownership change regime within section 355 in a hodgepodge fashion,
Congress should simply graft the ownership change standard that is
already well developed in section 382 and apply that criteria to the
testing period set forth for section 355.192 Except for one minor
exception noted in the following paragraph, section 355’s core goals
190. See § 382(h)(1)(A) (clarifying NUBIG at the time of the section 355
transaction). This approach is similar to the result afforded for a subsequent
conversion of corporation to REIT status within ten years of its being involved in a
Section 355 transaction except that the testing period is not as onerous. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.337(d)-7(d)(2)(B)(iii).
191. For earlier proposals that appear similar to this proposal, see Simon &
Simmons, supra note 44, at 297 (arguing that distributes of the controlled corporation
stock could be required to hold the stock for a period, such as five years, after the
distribution, to address the avoidance of corporate level taxes on asset appreciation);
see also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 100TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS TO
INCREASE REVENUES PREPARED FOR THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, at 172 (Comm. Print
1987) (setting forth this same recommendation). Another variation is set forth by
Professors Simon and Simmons, who have written that tainting provisions for stock
received from distribution under section by shareholder distributees, either for a set
period or forever. See Simon & Simmons, supra note 44, at 294.
192. See Yin, supra note 108, at 375 (similarly considering the reform proposed in
this Article).
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can be met by utilizing the ownership change analysis set forth in
section 382 and can do so in a manner that provides more objective
certainty and rationality than currently exists in the ad hoc framework
provided in section 355(d) and section 355(e).
However, notwithstanding the versatility of section 382’s ownership
change criteria to handle the policy goals of section 355 as a general
matter, I readily admit that an owner shift that arises solely as a result of
a split-off to historic shareholders should not be treated as an owner shift
for purposes of determining an ownership change under section 355.
In this regard, for purposes of section 382, a five percent
shareholder of the distributing corporation is treated as a five percent
shareholder of its wholly owned subsidiary,193 and so a spin-off of the
controlled subsidiary, by itself, does not cause an owner shift of either
the distributing corporation or the controlled subsidiary as the spinoff causes the shareholders to actually own the stock of the controlled
subsidiary that they already are deemed to own proportionately.194
In contrast, a qualifying section 355 transaction that represents a
split-off can in fact create an owner shift under section 382 if the effect
of the split-off transaction is to increase the proportionate interest of
the shareholders in either the distributing corporation or the
controlled subsidiary. Treating a split-off as an owner shift is
appropriate under section 382 as doing so furthers the policy objective
of restricting the trafficking of loss corporations between any five
percent shareholders. But, section 355 is not interested in barring a
division of the controlled subsidiary to a subset of the historic
shareholders. In fact, section 355 contemplates that a split-off
transaction can occur and is legislatively sanctioned,195 and so it is at
this point where the continuity of shareholder interest analysis of an
owner shift under section 355 should diverge from the analysis of an
owner shift under section 382. Example 3, which is almost identical to
an example set forth in the 1986 legislative history to section 382,196
serves to demonstrate the singular proposed change to the section 382
analysis that would be employed in the section 355 context.

193. See I.R.C. § 382(c)(4)(E) (2012). This solution was briefly discussed in Simon
& Simmons, supra 44, at 297 (stating that “the holding period requirement could be
applied only to five percent or greater shareholders, with the public aggregated as
under section 382”).
194. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, at 181 (1986) (Conf. Rep.) (illustrating that no
ownership change occurred in Example 17).
195. See Treas. Reg. § 1.335-1(b) (2011).
196. H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, at 176.

508

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:447

a. Example #3
Distributing corporation is owned by two unrelated historic
shareholders: A (sixty percent) and C (forty percent). A controlled
subsidiary is a wholly owned subsidiary of the distributing corporation and
is therefore deemed to be owned by A and C in the same proportions as
their interest in the distributing corporation. The distributing corporation
distributes all of the controlled subsidiary to A in exchange for all of A’s
stock in the distributing corporation a section 355 transaction.
Under the general operation of section 382, there has been an
ownership change of the distributing corporation because the
percentage of the distributing corporation’s stock owned by C (100
percent) has increased by more than fifty percentage points over the
lowest percentage of the distributing corporation’s stock owned by C
at any time during the testing period (forty percent prior to the
distribution of the controlled subsidiary’s stock).197 There has not
been an ownership change under section 382 with respect to the
controlled subsidiary, however, because the percentage of the stock in
the controlled subsidiary owned by A (100 percent) has not increased
by more than fifty percentage points over the lowest percentage of
stock owned by A at any time during the testing period (sixty percent),
after application of the attribution rules.198 However, in this example,
both the shareholders (shareholder A and C) who experienced an
owner shift within the meaning of section 382(g)(2) did so solely as a
result of a qualifying section 355 transaction, and both Shareholder A
and Shareholder C represent historic (five-year) shareholders of the
distributing corporation. As a result, the impact of the owner shift as
to A and C is ignored for purposes of the ownership change analysis
under section 355.
This Article sets forth an administrable rule that achieves
appropriate outcomes for a transaction that is afforded section 355
treatment. But, suppose that an ownership change occurs with respect
to either the distributing corporation or the controlled subsidiary
within two years after the section 355 transaction. How would this
Article’s proposed reform address the context where the two-year postsection 355 transaction continuity test were not satisfied? The
following Example 4 illustrates the application of this aspect of the
Article’s reform proposal.

197. See id.
198. See id.
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b. Example #4
The distributing corporation has three shareholders: historic
shareholder A (fifty percent), historic shareholder B (thirty percent),
and shareholder C (twenty percent) who acquired its interest three
years before the section 355 transaction posited in this example. The
distributing corporation distributes the controlled subsidiary to B and
C in exchange for all of their interest in the distributing corporation
such that B and C each own sixty percent and forty percent,
respectively, of the controlled subsidiary. One year after the section
355 transaction, the controlled subsidiary acquires another company
in a tax-free reorganization where D becomes a new shareholder in the
controlled subsidiary. The resulting ownership percentages in the
controlled corporation become as follows: B (forty-eight percent), C
(thirty-two percent), and D (twenty percent).
The controlled subsidiary experienced an owner shift of forty
percent when C, the non-historic shareholder,199 increased its interest
from zero to forty percent in the controlled subsidiary in the five years
preceding and including the section 355 transaction, but at that point
there had not been an ownership change as there was not a more than
fifty-point increase in the interest of a five percent shareholder during
the testing period. If there had been an ownership change at that time,
then the section 355 transaction would have been taxable at the
corporate level and at the shareholder level. Since there was not an
ownership change at that time, the section 355 transaction provided
nonrecognition treatment in the year of that transaction. However,
during the testing period but after the section 355 transaction, D
becomes a twenty percent shareholder in the controlled corporation
and creates another twenty-point owner shift, and so now the
controlled corporation has experienced an ownership change during
the testing period because non-historic five percent shareholders have
experienced a greater than fifty-point increase of their interest over
the lowest percentage of stock owned during the testing period. Thus,
on the date of the ownership change, the controlled subsidiary must
recognize all of its net unrealized built-in gain that existed at the time

199. See Rev. Rul. 74-5, 1974-1 C.B. 82 (contrasting the static five-year, pretransaction testing period set forth in this Article’s reform proposal). In addition, the
reform proposal set forth in this Article does not condition the application of new
section 355(d) on whether shareholder C acquired its interest “by purchase” or
through a “plan or series of related transactions.” I.R.C. § 355(e)(2)(B) (2012).
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of the section 355 transaction and will be afforded a fair market value
basis in all of its corporate assets.200
One criticism of the above proposal is that it could create a
significant corporate level tax consequence due to the shareholder
ownership changes that occur during the testing period but were not
contemplated at the time of the section 355 transaction.201 This same
criticism could be leveled against section 382’s limitation of corporate
level tax attributes due to a shareholder ownership change, but in the
section 382 context, Congress has chosen objective tests and in part
handled this criticism by ignoring owner shifts among less than five
percent shareholders. Furthermore, after the financial crisis of 2008,
it has become an accepted technique202 to use poison pill stock plans
to prevent ownership changes that could negatively impact a
corporation’s tax attributes, and the Delaware courts have upheld
these plans as a reasonable exercise of the director’s business
judgment.203 Thus, a public corporation and its board of directors
could take affirmative steps at the time of a section 355 transaction to
ensure that the bright-line post-transaction continuity of interest
requirement will be satisfied during the two-year post-spin-off testing
period set forth in this Article,204 and if the company chooses to not do
200. See I.R.S. Notice 2003-65, 2003-2 C.B. 747.
201. See Simon & Simmons, supra note 44, at 299 (arguing for the use of a five-year
before and after rule, which would have the same intended affect and would follow
the same continuity rules under section 382).
202. See, e.g., Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 75 (Apr. 4,
2011); Citigroup, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 111–12 (Mar. 12,
2010); J.C. Penney Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 67 (Mar. 21, 2014); Ford
Motor Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 73 (Apr. 1, 2010); Ford Motor Co.,
Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 90 (Mar. 28, 2013).
203. See Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., Inc., No. 4241-VCN, 2010 WL 703062, at
*25 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2010) (upholding the board of director’s business judgment to
adopt a poison pill rights plans that prevented an ownership change within the
meaning of section 382 so as to preserve the loss corporation’s net operating loss tax
attributes).
204. Public deals already provide post-spin-off restrictions to ensure that spin-offs
satisfy the requirements of section 355 under current law. See, e.g., Hewlett Packard
Enter. Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2 (May 24, 2016) (disclosing spin-off of its
computer service business to Everett and then Computer Science Corporation, which
would acquire less than 50% ownership of Everett in a subsequent reverse Morris Trust
transaction, and continuing post-transaction covenants as to ensure qualification for
section 355 treatment); Tenneco Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2 (Apr. 10, 2018)
(including a stand-still agreement applicable to the distributed corporation and its
shareholders for one year after the spin-off); Park Hotels & Resorts Inc., Current
Report (Form 8-K) 3 (Jan. 2, 2017) (restricting parties in the spin-off transaction from
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so, or chooses to later rescind such a poison pill plan, then this
outcome demonstrates that section 355 did in fact operate as a device
to facilitate the disposition of appreciated assets out of corporate
solution to new owners in violation of the goals of section 355.
In a recent revenue procedure, the IRS provided more certainty with
respect to whether the control test of section 368(c) is satisfied when
the voting interest in the controlled subsidiary is altered prior to a
section 355 spin-off and then the altered voting structure is unwound
after the spin-off.205 In Revenue Procedures 2016-40, the IRS indicated
that altering the voting interest in the controlled subsidiary prior to
the spin-off so that section 368(c) control exists prior to the spin-off
will be respected if the voting structure is not unwound within two
years after the section 355 transaction.206 The announcement of a clear
post-spin-off two-year test has been reported as having the following
positive, normative effect.207
This Article’s objective post-transaction two-year continuity testing
period requirement is analogous to the continuity test set forth in
Revenue Procedure 2016-40. Like Revenue Procedure 2016-40 has
done in its context, the adoption of a bright-line two-year continuity
test for determining historic shareholders for purposes of section 355
provides a transparent rule that draws upon the objective standards
that already exists in section 382.
A continuity test that relies on objective standards reduces the
opportunities for gamesmanship that plague subjective standards, and
as a result an objective post-continuity testing period better fulfills
Congress’s “strong form” of General Utilities repeal that it has repeatedly
sought to implement.208 If one were to start from scratch, the above

reframing for two years so to not impact the tax-free status of the spin-off transaction
under section 355).
205. See Laura Davison, IRS Adds Certainty for Unwinding Control After Spinoff, DAILY
TAX REP. (2016) (stating that the certainty “is probably considered a win for taxpayers
and IRS”).
206. See Rev. Proc. 2016-40, § 4.01, 2016-32 C.B. 228, 229.
207. The clear two year test “enables . . . tax lawyers to do what [they] rarely get to do,
which is actually give [their] clients a clear answer to a question they ask . . . . Now [tax
lawyers] can say, ‘wait two years.’” See Amy S. Elliott, Guidelines Placed on Control Workarounds
for Spinoffs, TAX NOTES (2016) (quoting Jay M. Singer of McDermott Will & Emery LLP).
208. Even if differential rates for qualified dividends and long-term capital gains were
restored for individual taxpayers, this objective continuity test would still promote the
goals of the historic device test. Thus, the approach advocated herein is broad enough
to cover the historic bail out concerns as well as holistically address more generally an
effort to use section 355 to effectuate a disposition of historic businesses to new owners.
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continuity of interest rule would simultaneously achieve the goal of
affording nonrecognition treatment to transactions like the Rockefeller
fact pattern where historic shareholders separated historic businesses
into separate corporations but then maintained their investment in
those businesses, albeit in modified corporate form. But at the same
time, this Article’s objective testing period would provide strong
protections against efforts to utilize section 355 to dispose of historic
businesses to new owners or to afford opportunities for shareholders
to monetize or cash-out of their investments in historic businesses on
a tax-free basis. Given the administrative convenience benefits of
objective tests, given that Congress already has enacted objective
ownership testing criteria under section 382 that could be relied upon
in the section 355 context, and given that taxpayers have the ability to
take appropriate steps to comply with this bright-line standard, the
adoption of an objective continuity of interest testing period in section
355 (in lieu of the subjective intent and facts and circumstances
standards that section 355 currently employs) represents a substantial
improvement over current law. An objective standard can better
implement Congress’s “strong form” version of General Utilities repeal
while transparently allowing section 355 to fulfill its core mission:
namely, afford tax-free treatment in the limited context of a corporate
separation that merely represents a rearrangement of historic assets
among historic shareholders who desire to continue their interest in
modified corporate form.209
CONCLUSION
Congress started down the path to fundamental corporate tax
reform with the Tax Reform Act of 1986, but it failed to harmonize
section 355’s scope with its broader effort to repeal the General Utilities
doctrine at that time. Moreover, section 355 has been hampered by its
antiquated shareholder level bail out focus. Now that a concern over
a bail out of earnings and profits at capital gains rates is no longer a
critical policy goal, section 355 should be rethought in terms of the
policy goals that matter for the post-General Utilities repeal era.
Congress has repeatedly amended section 355 in the years after 1986
in an attempt to harmonize section 355’s application with its “strong
form” version of General Utilities repeal, but these efforts have failed to
fulfill Congress’s “strong form” policy goals. The Treasury Department
has been given regulatory authority to ensure that section 355 does not
209. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1) (2011).
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provide taxpayers with an inappropriate device to circumvent
Congress’s repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. However, the
Treasury Department’s extant regulatory actions have also been
underinclusive. It is long past time to reform section 355 so that its
scope of application is harmonized with Congress’s clearly articulated
“strong form” version of General Utilities repeal.
The legislative history in the post-1986 period makes clear that
section 355 was intended to be a limited exception that should be
restricted to corporate separations of historic business assets among
historic shareholders. Section 355 was never intended to be the
“beating heart of mergers and acquisitions activity in the United
States.”210 The fact that section 355 serves as a means to afford
nonrecognition treatment to transactions that are more akin to a
disposition simply demonstrates that section 355 has strayed away from
its core mission and has become a device for circumventing Congress’s
desired repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
Comprehensive section 355 reform is long past due: it is time to
bring section 355 back into alignment with its core mission and to
address its overbreadth. Section 355 should not afford nonrecognition
treatment to corporate separations that are more akin to a disposition
as doing so allows assets to be transferred out of corporate solution to
a new shareholder economic group without the recognition of
corporate level gain. That outcome represents a circumvention of the
“strong form” version of repeal of the General Utilities doctrine that
Congress has repeatedly endorsed in the post-1986 era.
The reforms advocated in this Article, if adopted, would remove a
significant amount of the complexity and subjectivity that exists within
section 355 and would harmonize section 355 with Congress’s desired
repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. Section 355 in its present form
places too much reliance on subjective standards, and this overreliance on subjective standards has had the further consequence of
creating needless complexity. Thus, Congress and the Treasury
Department should once again return to section 355 and finally
harmonize its scope with its larger General Utilities repeal efforts.

210. Cummings, supra note 9.

